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THE CONSENSUS CONSTITUTION
Justin Driver*
An ascendant view within constitutionallaw contends that the Supreme
Court almost inevitably interprets the Constitution in a manner that reflects
the "consensus" beliefs of the American public. Given that many of the
Constitution's key provisions contain indeterminate language, this view
claims that Supreme Court Justices imbue those phrases with the prevailing
sentiments of the times. This increasingly influential approach-onethat is
articulated by some of the most prominent voices within modern legal
academia-aims to correct what it deems a romantic myth regarding the
Court's ability to protect minority rights.
This Article challenges the ascendant view by identifying and critiquing
the defining features of what it labels "consensus constitutionalism." Despite being grounded in history, consensus constitutionalism reveals no
familiaritywith a defining debate thatflourished among American historians
that stretches back to the 1950s-a debate that resulted in conflict-based
history supplanting its consensus-based counterpart. Consensus constitutionalism offers an unsatisfying understandingof history, as it obscures the
deep cleavages that often divide Americans regarding constitutional
Consensus constitutionalism also offers an unsatisfying
questions.
understanding of law, as it invites a foreordained conception of constitutional decisionmaking and an anemic notion of the Court's
countermajoritarian capabilities. Reexamining Brown v. Board of
Education and Loving v. Virginia, this Article provides an alternate
approach to exploring legal history-contested constitutionalism-which
honors the significance of both ideological conflict and the Court's countermajoritariancapacities.

* Assistant Professor, The University of Texas School of Law. I received particularly helpful
comments on earlier drafts from Katharine Bartlett, Stuart Banner, Mitchell Berman, Alan Brinkley,
Alfred Brophy, Josh Chafetz, Sherry Colb, Karen Engle, Laura Ferry, Cary Franklin, Joseph
Fishkin, William Forbath, David Garrow, Jacob Gersen, Julius Getman, Jamal Greene, Ariela
Gross, Lani Guinier, Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Pamela Harris, Bert Huang, Amy Kapczynski,
Sanford Levinson, Jennifer Laurin, Richard Markovits, David Oshinsky, James T. Patterson,
Lucas A. Powe, Jr., David Pozen, John Robertson, David Rabban, Lawrence Sager, Suzanna Sherry,
Reva Siegel, Kevin Stack, Jordan Steiker, Gerald Torres, and Mark Tushnet. I also received useful
feedback from faculty workshop participants at the University of Chicago, the University of Texas,
and Vanderbilt University. Charles Mackel, Michael Raupp, Christine Tamer, and Mark Wiles
provided excellent research assistance.
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Introduction
Fifteen years ago, Professor Michael Klarman issued a clarion call
urging his fellow law professors to examine the Supreme Court's twentiethcentury constitutional decisions from an external vantage point.1 In contrast
to scholarship that analyzes doctrinal developments in hermetic isolation, the
"external perspective" places judicial decisions within their larger social and
political context.2 Although externalists long ago succeeded in illuminating
some nineteenth-century constitutional decisions,3 Klarman lamented what
he perceived as the method's near abandonment regarding constitutional decisions of more recent vintage.4 In Klarman's assessment, legal academicsbesotted by the Warren Court's landmark decisions-rejected externalism
because they were dedicated to advancing the wrongheaded notion that the
Court possessed a robust capacity for issuing decisions that protect marginalized groups.
"It is my belief that the myth of the Court as
countermajoritarian savior is largely responsible for this gap in the
literature," Klarman contended. 5 "It is time for constitutional historians to
explode that myth, to identify and describe the parameters within which judicial review actually operates, and to create a richer and more credible
account of the twentieth century's civil rights and civil liberties
revolutions." 6
In many respects, it would appear that legal academia has heeded
Klarman's call. External examinations of twentieth-century constitutional
law, though never as neglected as Klarman suggested, now constitute
nothing less than a dominant mode of understanding Supreme Court
decisionmaking. Indeed, many of the most distinguished professors writing
today view modern constitutional law through the external lens.

1. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1, 67 (1996).
2. Id. at 66-67.
3. See id. at 66 (citing DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978); STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE
DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971)).
4. Id at 66.
5. Id at 67.
6. Id
7. The Court's shifting response to New Deal legislation-perhaps the most closely examined
period of twentieth-century constitutional law-has often been attributed to external forces. Many
scholars have suggested that President Franklin D. Roosevelt's outside political pressure played a
role in Justice Owen Roberts's "switch in time." See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D.
Roosevelt's Supreme Court "Packing" Plan, in ESSAYS ON THE NEW DEAL 69, 69-95 (Harold M.
Hollingsworth & William F. Holmes eds., 1969). Professor Barry Cushman's account of this period
is revisionist precisely because it seeks to understand the Court's response to the New Deal from an
internal, law-based perspective rather than an external, politics-based perspective. See Barry
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 206-07, 257-61 (1994).
8. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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In other respects, though, the clarion call has not yet been answered-or
even fully heard. Though Klarman sought "a richer and more credible
account" of constitutional decisions from the last century,9 the leading
scholarship employing externalism is notable for neither its richness nor its
credibility. Today's external legal history is marred by what this Article
labels "consensus constitutionalism," the claim that the Supreme Court
interprets the Constitution in a manner that reflects the "consensus" views of
the American public. This view is exemplified in recent major works by
0
prominent legal academics including Klarman,' Barry Friedman," Jeffrey
3
2
Those scholars-with their fixations on
Rosen,'1 and Cass Sunstein.1
societal "consensus"-paint American legal history with a disfiguringly
broad brush, obscuring the deep divisions that typify public response to constitutional questions.
This consensus school of constitutional interpretation results in
scholarship with two primary deficiencies. First, it makes for bad history.
Second, it makes for worse law.
The flight to consensus among law professors during the last decade
eerily echoes a movement to consensus among history professors that began
in the wake of World War II. In reaction to what they asserted was an overemphasis on the role that conflict played in prior examinations of the past, a
group of scholars led by Richard Hofstadter contended that historical
inquiries should instead focus upon American commonality.1 4 The search
among historians for unity rather than division burned incandescent during
the 1950s, but its heyday proved brief. In 1959, historian John Higham
wrote a devastating article deriding the "consensus school" of American
history for its homogeneous conception of the past, a conception that elided
the profound disagreements that have shaped the nation's history. 5
Higham's article succeeded in restoring conflict to its central place in historical interpretation, ultimately convincing even the founder of consensus-based
history of the school's severe methodological limitations.16

9. Klarman, supra note 1,at 67.
10. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
11. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
12. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: How THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA
(2006).
13. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT
DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE (2009).

14. See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
15. See John Higham, The Cult of the "American Consensus": Homogenizing Our History, 27

COMMENT. 93, 94 (1959) ("[C]urrent scholarship is carrying out a massive grading operation to
smooth over America's social convulsions.").
16. See infra text accompanying notes 60-72.
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Although consensus constitutionalists (to varying extents) ground their
scholarship in historical matters, their work bears no trace of the central debate that roiled history departments for many years. That debate among
historians would seem to contain essential lessons regarding the potential
pitfalls of external legal history, and it generated conclusions that are perfectly adverse to the way that law professors invoke "consensus" today.
Part I reviews that debate in some detail because many modem legal academics either never learned its lessons or once knew but have now forgotten
them.
The regrettable consequences of consensus-based scholarship are,
moreover, of even greater significance for law than they were for history.
The consensus school of constitutional interpretation suffers from three cenFirst, consensus
tral analytical shortcomings, addressed in Part II.
constitutionalism often misconceives the American people as fundamentally
united when ideological divisions in fact pervade society. Second, consensus
constitutionalism's notion that the Court's decisions reflect the zeitgeist leads
to the misguided impression that judicial decisions are inevitable, meaning
that the Court's composition is largely irrelevant. Third, if the Justices accept consensus constitutionalism's warning about the dangers of the Court
outpacing public opinion, the theory contains distressing normative implications regarding the Court's ability to clash with majority preferences.
Simply because the execution of externalism has thus far been wanting,
however, does not mean that the underlying methodology should be jettisoned altogether. To the contrary, this Article in Part III proposes an external
methodology called "contested constitutionalism." This alternate externalist
approach observes that the Court's interpretation of our founding document
typically arises in the face of ideological conflict, not ideological consensus.
Rather than only abstractly exploring this concept, this Article illustrates how
contested constitutionalism plays out in practice by providing a revised account of the Court's role in recognizing black Americans as full citizens
during the 1950s and 1960s. When the Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education,'7 the racial attitudes of Americans revealed greater complexity
and inner conflict (both regionally and racially) than the consensusconstitutionalist narrative generally allows. Drawing upon the Court's
decision invalidating prohibitions on interracial marriage in Loving v.
Virginia, this Article contends, against the consensus-constitutionalist
account, that the Court has historically played a significant role in protecting
minority interests-and further argues that it could (and should) do so again
if it ultimately addresses a claim involving same-sex marriage. 19 Although
no societal consensus currently exists regarding same-sex marriage, it is easy

17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. See infra section III(B)(2).
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to overlook that a much smaller percentage of Americans approved of interracial marriage when the Court decided Loving than now approve of samesex marriage.
Given that consensus constitutionalism offers a distorted view of Brown
and Loving, it stands to reason that contested constitutionalism would similarly enhance our understanding of many constitutional decisions that have
received less scholarly attention. Accordingly, this Article concludes by
challenging scholars to employ contested constitutionalism to explore the full
range of American legal history in all of its nuance, complexity, and
ambiguity.
I.

The Rise and Fall of Consensus-Based History

A. The Rise
In December 1947, as the book that would become known as The
American Political Tradition underwent final revision, Richard Hofstadter
received a disconcerting letter from his publisher.2 0 Alfred A. Knopf, the
legendary founder of the eponymous publishing house, suggested that the
thirty-one-year-old Columbia University historian should compose an introduction designed to link the various chapters offering reassessments of
historical figures that formed the book's core. 2 1 "We want, as far as possible,
to get away from the idea that it is just a collection of essays," Knopf
explained. 22 "I feel that the introduction is ... very important." 23 This letter,
Hofstadter would later reveal, invited him to undertake precisely the task that
he had hoped to avoid: positing a unified theory of American history.24
Despite his trepidation, Hofstadter recognized Knopf's request as reasonable.
"And so I hazarded my six-page introduction," Hofstadter recalled years
later, "which has probably made as much trouble for me as any other passage
Although this claim sounds somewhat
of comparable length."25
overwrought, Hofstadter errs, if anything, on the side of understatement.

20. DAVID S. BROWN, RICHARD HOFSTADTER: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 50-51 (2006).
At that time, Hofstadter's book was known in-house as Men and Ideas in American Politics. Id. at
51.
21. Id.
22. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Hofstadter later noted:
I suppose that this had been exactly the challenge I had been trying to evade, since I
was in a period of intellectual transition and had sense enough to know that I had not
arrived at a point in my life at which I was either learned or settled enough to be ready
to put together a synthetic statement about the meaning of the American political
tradition.
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION: AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT xxii
(1973 ed. 1985) (1948).
25. Id.
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Indeed, over time, The American Political Tradition'ssix introductory pages
would be understood as nothing less than the opening salvo in one of the defining historical debates that occurred during the latter half of the twentieth
century.26
Hofstadter's introduction asserted that U.S. historians had, for at least a
generation, placed excessive emphasis on the role that conflict played in
shaping American society. Hofstadter charged that, as a result of the
Progressive historians' obsession with conflict, historians had misunderstood
Americans as being defined more by their differences than by their
commonalities.27 Where the Progressives saw division, Hofstadter saw unity.
"The following studies in the ideology of American statesmanship have convinced me of the need for a reinterpretation of our political traditions which
emphasizes the common climate of American opinion," Hofstadter wrote. 28
"The existence of such a climate of opinion has been much obscured by the
tendency to place political conflict in the foreground of history."29 Whatever
their superficial differences, Hofstadter contended that Americans shared a
common set of beliefs-a mindset that served to avert any potential for fundamental strife. "The fierceness of the political struggles has often been
misleading," Hofstadter suggested, because "the range of vision embraced by
the primary contestants in the major parties has always been bounded by the
horizons of property and enterprise."3 o In Hofstadter's estimation, American
dissidents (such as they are) do not wish to overthrow the economic system;
they want only a larger piece of it.
Extending his claim of fundamental commonality beyond the economic
and political realms, Hofstadter further suggested that Americans held a
united set of cultural views. "Above and beyond temporary and local conflicts there has been a common ground, a unity of cultural and political
tradition, upon which American civilization has stood," Hofstadter wrote. 31
"That culture has been intensely nationalistic and for the most part
isolationist; it has been fiercely individualistic and capitalistic."3 2 Given that
26. See PETER NOvICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 332-521 (1988) (examining historiographical trends sparked
by the dispute over consensus history); BERNARD STERNSHER, CONSENSUS, CONFLICT, AND
AMERICAN HISTORIANS passim (1975) (detailing the wide-ranging debate over consensus- and
conflict-based theories of history); Carl Degler, Book Review, 76 J. AM. HIST. 892, 893 (1989)
(noting that in the wake of the consensus-conflict debate "[t]he eruption of black, ethnic, women's,
and public history put an end, at least for the foreseeable future, to the dream of a unitary history");
David Oshinsky, The Humpty Dumpty of Scholarship, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2000, at B9
(examining the continuing legacy of the consensus-conflict debate).
27. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at xxix-xxxi (lamenting the focus on conflict in American
history and the resulting neglect of significant commonalities).
28. Id. at xxix.
29. Id
30. Id at xxx.
31. Id. at xxxii.
32. Id.
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ordinary Americans contemplated a menu of severely constrained options, it
is far from surprising that Hofstadter viewed their political leaders as generally following suit:
The range of ideas ... which practical politicians can conveniently
believe in is normally limited by the climate of opinion that sustains
their culture. They differ, sometimes bitterly, over current issues, but
they also share a general framework of ideas which makes it possible
for them to co-operate when the campaigns are over.
Underscoring his argument's breadth, Hofstadter observed expansively that
this insight "can profitably be extended to the rest of American history."34
Knopf issued The American Political Tradition in the fall of 1948 to
glowing reviews and, eventually, to surprisingly brisk sales. 35 Before his
death in 1970 at the age of fifty-four, Hofstadter wrote several extremely important (and extremely marketable) books, leading him to be saluted by Eric
Foner, among many others, as "the finest historian of his generation."3 6 Yet
it is The American Political Tradition,perhaps aided by its hastily composed
introduction, that Hofstadter biographer David S. Brown plausibly claims has
"earned a singular position in the annals of professional historical writing,"
and enabled its author to "succeed[] Charles Beard as the most influential
and intellectually significant American historian of his time."37
B. The Fall
Not everyone applauded the succession. In February 1959, slightly
more than a decade after Hofstadter assumed Beard's mantle, John Higham
wrote a critical essay in Commentary magazine called The Cult of the
"American Consensus": Homogenizing Our History.38 Higham portrayed
the preceding five decades of U.S. historical scholarship as a narrative of
decline. Before the fall, Higham wrote, "[a]n earlier generation of historians

33. Id at xxxi.
34. Id at xxxii.
35. BROWN, supra note 20, at 145-46; see, e.g., Gerald W. Johnson, Some Tenants of the White
House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1948, at BRI (book review) (describing the work as "shrewd, bold,
honest-and, on occasion, brilliantly illuminating"); Arthur R. Kooker, Book Review, 18 PAC.
HiST. REv. 253, 253 (1949) (stating the work "stamps [Hofstadter] as one of the brilliant young
scholars of our generation").
36. Eric Foner, The Education of RichardHofstadter, NATION, May 4, 1992, at 597. See also
Daniel Walker Howe & Peter Elliott Finn, Richard Hofstadter: The Ironies of an American

Historian, 43 PAC. HIST. REv. 1, 1 (1974) ("In his originality of thought, pervasiveness of
influence, felicity of expression, and range of interests, he had few if any equals in his profession.
Indeed, he was probably the most prominent member of a distinguished generation of American
historians."); Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Ferocious Strains in Our National Past: American

Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1970, at BRIO (calling Hofstadter "the most distinguished American
historian of his generation").
37. BROWN, supra note 20, at 50. Foner concurs that the book "propelled [Hofstadter] to the
very forefront of his profession." Foner, supra note 36, at 600.
38. Higham, supra note 15.
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... nurtured in a restless atmosphere of reform, had painted America in the
bold hues of conflict."39 When historical interpretation flourished, Higham
contended: "It was East vs. West ... ; farmers vs. businessmen ... ; city vs.

country; property rights vs. human rights; Hamiltonianism vs.
Jeffersonianism. These lines of cleavage were charted continuously from the
Colonial period to the present.'4o
Higham lamented that modem historians, rather than identifying the
conflict that divided the nation, emphasized the consensus that united it.
"Instead of two traditions or sections or classes deployed against one another
all along the line of national development," Higham contended, "we are told
that America in the largest sense has had one unified culture. Classes have
turned into myths, sections have lost their solidarity, ideologies have vaporized into climates of opinion." 4 1 Higham blamed domestic conservatism
following World War II for the "deadening effect on the historian's ability to
take a conflict of ideas seriously," as "[e]ither he disbelieves in the conflict
itself (Americans having been pretty much of one mind), or he trivializes it
into a set of psychological adjustments to institutional change."42
Understanding American history as devoid of significant conflict caused
historians to see a "placid, unexciting past" inhabited by a people that were
"above all-remarkably homogeneous."4 3 This new, dreadfully wrong turn
in American history, Higham wrote, required society to "pay a cruel price in
dispensing with [the Progressive historians'] deeper values: an appreciation
of the crusading spirit, a responsiveness to indignation, a sense of
injustice.""
The principal targets of Higham's critique were two monographs
written in the mid-1950s, 45 Louis Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America46
and Daniel J. Boorstin's The Genius of American Politics.4 7 Somewhat
surprisingly, Higham's essay addressed Hofstadter's work only brieflyalmost incidentally. Instead of invoking The American Political Tradition,
moreover, Higham criticized Hofstadter's latest publication, The Age of
Reform.4 That book, Higham suggested, fueled the modem historical trend
of depicting social movements not as mounting challenges to the prevailing
order but instead as efforts to achieve mere restoration, principally motivated

39. Id. at 94.
40. Id.

41. Id. at 95.
42. Id. at 100.
43. Id at 94.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 95-96.
LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION INAMERICA (2d ed. 1991).
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1958).
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955).
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by nostalgia for a bygone era. 49 Higham contended that Hofstadter "presents
Populism in the 1890's and Progressivism in the early 20th century not as
mighty upheavals but as archaic efforts to recapture the past."50 Despite The
Age of Reform's espousal of a generally consensus-oriented approach to
history, Higham may have spared Hofstadter from more sustained (and
withering) scrutiny because the book at least succeeded in "recogniz[ing]
fairly radical changes in the recent past" regarding the "elements of social
revolution in the New Deal."s'
Whatever the explanation for Higham leveling the consensus charge at
Hofstadter somewhat halfheartedly, later historians would hurl it with considerably more vigor. 52 Over the years, Hofstadter's admirers have
repeatedly-and tirelessly-attempted to beat back the consensus label on
his behalf. In 1973, Christopher Lasch, a former graduate student of
Hofstadter's and a major intellectual figure in his own right,5 3 wrote an
introduction to a new edition of The American Political Tradition, which
mainly sought to refute the idea that the book should be understood as an
exercise in consensus history.54 Although conceding that "Hofstadter
undoubtedly helped to prepare the way for the consensus theorists of the
1950's," Lasch asserted that the book "had nothing in common with the celebration of American 'pragmatism"' and viewed widespread agreement within
the nation "as a form of intellectual bankruptcy." 5 By 1989, however, Lasch
sought to shift the battle to different terrain by arguing not so much that
Hofstadter did not practice consensus history, but that the significance of the

49. Higham, supra note 15, at 94 ("We have learned that the Jacksonians yearned nostalgically
to restore the stable simplicity of a bygone age, and that the Populists were rural businessmen
deluded by a similar pastoral mythology.").
50. Id. at 94-95.
51. Id. at 94.
52. See BROWN, supra note 20, at 50.
53. See ERIC MILLER, HOPE IN A SCATTERING TIME: A LIFE OF CHRISTOPHER LASCH (2010)

(analyzing Lasch's intellectual contributions, including-perhaps most significantly-The Culture
ofNarcissism).
54. Christopher Lasch, Forewordto HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at x-xii.
55. Id at xii. Historians echoed Lasch's defense of Hofstadter in the mid-1970s. See also
Howe & Finn, supra note 36, at 2 ("To be sure, Hofstadter thought there was an identifiable

mainstream of American life and that it was best described as middle-class capitalism. He devoted
most of his professional efforts to studying movements he felt were within this consensus.
However, he did not celebrate the virtues of the tradition he identified."); Harry N. Scheiber, A Keen
Sense of History and the Need to Act: Reflections on Richard Hofstadter and The American
Political Tradition, 2 REv. AM. HIST. 445, 451 (1974) ("Far from admiring or extolling consensus,
Hofstadter reserves for it his most chilling and occasionally contemptuous rhetoric."). More than

thirty years later, historians continue to defend Hofstadter.

See David Greenberg, Richard

Hofstadter Reconsidered, RARITAN, Fall 2007, at 144, 149 (rejecting Higham's grouping of
Hofstadter with Hartz, Boorstin, and Clinton Rossiter, and contending that "[a] cursory reading
makes plain that Hofstadter was lamenting the narrow boundaries of the political culture").
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consensus-conflict debate itself had been sorely overblown, amounting to
little more than academic intramural squabbling. 56
C. The Fallout
Scholarly disputes seldom yield an undisputed victor. But in the
conflict-consensus dispute, it quickly became clear that only the conflictbased historians could plausibly assert victory. And Higham was far from
shy in so asserting. "The vogue of this quest for national definition proved
devastatingly brief," Higham wrote in 1979.58 "In a few years of the early
and midsixties what was called 'consensus' history suddenly lost credibility.
The entire conceptual foundation on which it rested crumbled away. As an
analytic construct, national character was largely repudiated in all of the social sciences in which it had flourished."59
Perhaps no testimony better illustrates consensus history's demise than
the words of Hofstadter himself. Toward the end of his career, Hofstadter
acknowledged (however tersely) that with respect to the fight over consensus
he got better than he gave. Hofstadter seized The American Political
Tradition's publication in Hebrew in 1967 to write a preface that sought to
distance his work from other scholars in the consensus school, making public
a stance that he had long adopted in private.60 The debate over consensus

56. Christopher Lasch, Consensus: An Academic Question?, 76 J. AM. HIST. 457, 458 (1989)

("[T]he controversy about 'consensus' has always struck me as artificial and unimportant-one of
those nondebates that academic historians invent for their own amusement, for the making and
breaking of academic reputations."); cf Alan Brinkley, Richard Hofstadter'sThe Age of Reform: A
Reconsideration, 13 REVS. AM. HIST. 462, 476 (1985) ("Critics of modem historiography have
spent a large and perhaps inordinate amount of time and energy arguing over whether Hofstadter
was truly a member of the 'consensus school' that came to dominate historical writing in the
1950s.").
57. See Nicholas Lemann, The New American Consensus: Government of by and for the
Comfortable, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, 37, 70 (Magazine) ("The consensus school in American
history, such as it was, lay in ruins within a few years of the publication of Higham's devastating

article.").
58. John Higham, Introduction to NEW DIRECTIONS INAMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, at
xii (John Higham & Paul K. Conkin eds., 1979); see also John Higham, Changing Paradigms:The
Collapse of Consensus History, 76 J. AM. HIST. 460, 464 (1989) ("The flight from consensus was so

precipitous as to suggest that the paradigm was not only fragile and incomplete but that it somehow
invited its own destruction.").
59. Higham, Introduction to NEW DIRECTIONS INAMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, supra
note 58, at xii.
60. See BROWN, supra note 20, at 50 (noting that Hofstadter "privately much resisted" his title
as a consensus historian). The preface to the Hebrew edition also attempted to contextualize The
American PoliticalTradition'sby then infamous six-page introduction:

This book was not written in order to establish some single overarching theory about
American politics or American political leadership, but rather to make a number of
interpretive and critical comments on certain political figures on whom I had done
some special work or who particularly captured my interest. Circumstances, however,
made it seem in the end somewhat more ambitious than it had been meant to be, and
these had to do mainly with changes suggested by the publisher as it moved toward
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history, Hofstadter wrote, "has been very awkward for me, in the sense that it
has linked me with other historians with whom I have significant differences,
and because I have some serious misgivings of my own about what is known
After mounting an extremely narrow defense of
as consensus history."6
consensus as "only an assertion about the frame or the configuration of
history and not about what goes on in the picture," Hofstadter sharply criticized the blinkered history that stems from overemphasizing national
cohesion.6 2 "Americans may not have quarreled over profound ideological
matters, as these are formulated in the history of political thought, but they
quarreled consistently enough over issues that had real pith and moment,"
Hofstadter wrote. "And their unappeasable conflicts finally brought them in
1861 to one of the momentous and tragic political failures in modem
history."63 But such conflict, Hofstadter emphasized, was far from confined
to the Civil War. "Even in more tranquil phases of our history, an obsessive
fixation on the elements of consensus that do undoubtedly exist strips the
story of the drama and the interest it has."6
With the publication of The Progressive Historians in 1968,65
Hofstadter offered a still more critical assessment of consensus history.
Acknowledging that the notion of consensus has "intrinsic limitations as
history," Hofstadter suggested that historians would do well to contemplate
the series of questions that sociologists and political scientists have posed
regarding the boundaries of consensus:
Who is excluded from the consensus? Who refuses to enter it? To
what extent are the alleged consensual ideas of the American
system-its preconceptions, for instance, about basic political rightsactually shared by the mass public? (So far as the masses are
concerned, what we call consensus is often little more than apathy.)66
Historians, Hofstadter suggested, need not search particularly hard to find
meaningful conflict throughout American history.67 Referencing various
societal tumults ranging from the American Revolution through the upheaval
of the 1960s, Hofstadter stated, "Surely these episodes evoke a record of significant conflict to which we cannot expect to do justice if we write our
history in terms of the question whether or not Americans were disagreeing

publication. My original title, which was less demanding and more faithful to the
random and unsystematic character of my intentions, was Men and Ideas in American
Politics.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at xxi-xxii.

61. Id. at xxiii.
62. Id. at xxiv.
63. Id
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HisTORIANs (1968).
Id. at 452-53.
Id. at 458-59.
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with John Locke."68 The Civil War, Hofstadter again observed, posed a
particularly awkward fit for historians dedicated to advancing consensus.
"In the face of [the 1860s] political collapse," Hofstadter wrote, "what does it
matter if Professor Hartz reassures us that, because the Southern states were
simply adhering to their own view of the Constitution which they incorporated into the Confederate constitution, the Civil War does not represent a
real failure of the American consensus?"7 0
The most striking feature of the debate regarding consensus-based
history versus conflict-based history is the limited ground on which the
debate occurred. After a brief period, the real action in the debate centered
not on which framework made for better history, but whether the charge of
consensus--once leveled-proved warranted. Hofstadter and his defenders
resisted the charge so intently for so long because to admit to embracing consensus history was to confess to practicing an inferior mode of historical
inquiry. Few serious historians trained in the United States would today
contend that consensus, as opposed to conflict, offers the superior lens with
which to examine the American past. Regrettably, the widespread embrace
of conflict within the history department has yet to migrate across campus to

68. Id at 459.

69. Id at 460-62. Notably, Higham's classic essay suggested that consensus historians
underplayed the Civil War precisely because the facts were so desperately inconvenient: "Among
earlier crises, the Civil War alone has resisted somewhat the flattening process. Yet a significant
decline has occurred in the number of important contributions to Civil War history from
professional scholars. One is tempted to conclude that disturbances which cannot be minimized
must be neglected." Higham, supra note 15, at 95.
70. HOFSTADTER, supra note 65, at 461. Here, Hofstadter echoes the critique of J.R. Pole, who
wrote of Hartz's claim regarding the alleged consensus that undergirded the Civil War: "At this
point consensus may be thought to have lost its usefulness. Might one not as well suggest that the
French Wars of Religion do not represent a real religious cleavage because both Catholics and
Huguenots avowed their faith in the Christian religion?" J.R. Pole, The American Past: Is It Still
Usable?, 1 J. AM. STUD. 63, 75 (1967).
Was Hofstadter being unduly self-critical by acknowledging the affinity of at least some of his
work with consensus history? The core of the case for Hofstadter's defenders, as described above,
hinges on the contention that Hofstadter expressed contempt, rather than admiration, for the
consensus that he identified. See, e.g., Scheiber, supra note 55, at 451. This claim is true so far as
it goes, but it does not get Hofstadter completely off the consensus hook. After all, Hartz too
criticized the consensus that he described in The Liberal Tradition, a point that Higham himself
made in his initial essay. Higham, supra note 15, at 96. Why should Hofstadter be pardoned when
Hartz is hanged? Hofstadter loyalists can at best make out a claim that he-and Hartz, for that
matter-practiced a less troubling form of consensus history than the celebratory form practiced
most prominently by Boorstin. See Greenberg, supra note 55, at 149-50 (explaining that, in
contrast to Boorstin and company, Hofstadter's writings are not "expressions of gratitude for the
absence in this country of the class strife and instability that wracked Europe"). The principal
problem with consensus history, however, was not whether its adherents cheered or booed the
notion of an undivided nation. Rather, the problem with consensus history stemmed from the
inaccurate identification of consensus in the first instance. After a relatively brief infatuation with
consensus following World War II, U.S. historians returned to the emphasis on conflict because
they concluded that the Progressives' mode of historical interpretation provided a more discerning
lens with which to view the American past.
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the law school. 7 I As a result, too much of the leading scholarship on
American constitutional history written by law professors inaccurately
portrays the Supreme Court as interpreting the Constitution in a manner that
articulates the consensus ideals of the American people. 2
II.

Consensus Constitutionalism in Legal Scholarship

More than five decades after John Higham identified and criticized the
consensus school of American historians, the use of consensus as an explanatory device has become virtually extinct-at least among historians.
Among law professors, however, consensus-driven historical interpretation
not only exists but is flourishing, as many distinguished scholars currently
writing legal history examine the past through consensus-tinted spectacles.
These scholars contend that, throughout Supreme Court history, the Justices
have read the Constitution so as to reflect Americans' consensus views.
Although the move toward consensus seems an especially awkward fit
for constitutional law, today's consensus constitutionalism nevertheless
flows from the same scholarly wellspring as the consensus history of the
1950s. Both groups of scholars write out of an effort to correct what they
regard as the interpretive excesses of their predecessors. Hofstadter made
plain in The ProgressiveHistoriansthat his historical approach emphasized
consensus because of the previous generation's emphasis on conflict.7 3 Prior

71. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that no law professors demonstrate an awareness of the
consensus-conflict debate. One particularly apposite example of such awareness appears in
Professor G. Edward White's anguished preface to the second edition of his overtly Hofstadterinspired volume, The American JudicialTradition:

In the first edition I disclaimed any particular approach to historiographical issues. In
particular, I indicated that my delineation of a 'tradition' of American appellate
judging should not be taken as evidence of a 'consensus' approach to history. In
retrospect, I think the institutional emphasis of the chapter subtitles may undermine
that claim. I do want to say, however, that at the time of the first edition the
connection between 'consensus history' and an institutionally oriented approach to
appellate judging was not clear in my mind, so that if I held a 'consensus' perspective
it was unconscious. That, of course, does not make the perspective any less
significant: indeed, it now seems to me that I was more imprisoned by the structures of
Process Jurisprudence, with its emphasis on the relative competence of various
institutional decisionmakers in American society, than I would have cared to admit.
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADMON: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN

JUDGES xxii (3d ed. 2007). This preface, which White penned in 1988, reveals how large the
consensus-conflict debate loomed decades after it began.
72. This instance is far from the first time that history's lessons have failed to make the journey
to law schools. For important examinations of the sometimes awkward relationship between law
and history, see Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 523 (1995); William E. Forbath, ConstitutionalChange and the Politics ofHistory,
108 YALE L.J. 1917 (1999); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in
Legal Scholarship,66 FORDHAM L. REv. 87 (1997); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119.
73. HOFSTADTER, supra note 65, at 439.
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historians "had pushed polarized conflict as a principle of historical interpretation so far that one could go no further in that direction without risking
self-caricature," Hofstadter wrote. 74 "The pendulum had to swing in the
opposite direction: if we were to have any new insight into American history,
it began to appear that we had to circumvent the emphasis on conflict and
look at the American past from another angle."7 s
In a similar vein, consensus constitutionalists writing today view their
work as counteracting the excessive faith in the Supreme Court's ability to
protect minority rights that once flourished in legal academia. According to
this assessment, many legal scholars-basking in the reflected glory of the
Warren Court's great liberal decisions-permitted themselves to be swept up
in the wrongheaded belief that the Court can actually protect minorities from
majorities. "The romantic image of the Court as countermajoritarian savior
is shattered by historical reality," Klarman has explained.
Klarman has
gone so far as to contend that legal scholars rely upon the myth that the Court
can protect minority rights as a "psychological" crutch, which supports "our
need to be comforted in the face of a terrifying reality: majorities can and do
perpetrate many awful deeds." 7 7 Consensus constitutionalists portray their
work as throwing the cold water of reality onto overheated and even delusional conceptions of judicial capacity. "The decisions of the justices on the
meaning of the Constitution must be ratified by the American people,"
Friedman writes. "That's just the way it is."78 Klarman has explained that
"[m]ajority rule can be a scary thing," and that "[w]hile one can appreciate
the psychological imperative for believing in the Court's countermajoritarian
heroics, the historical record plainly suggests that such a view is
chimerical."
Despite the similarities, at least two significant analytical differences
distinguish the views of Higham's consensus historians from the views of the
scholars identified here as consensus constitutionalists. First, the two sets of
consensus scholars differ on the question of American ideological dynamism.
Whereas consensus historians emphasized that Americans shared a constant
set of foundational beliefs, consensus constitutionalists note that Americans
have repeatedly altered their conceptions and preferences. For the historians,

74. Id
75. Id
76. Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.L. REv. 145,

161 (1998); accord ROSEN, supra note 12, at 6 ("[M]ajoritarian scholars have argued that there's no
need to worry about judges thwarting the will of the people, because the vision of antidemocratic
courts protecting vulnerable minorities against tyrannical majorities is, in some sense, a romantic
myth.").
77. Klarman, supra note 1,at 19.
78. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 381.
79. Klarman, supra note 1,at 23-24.
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Americans held an identifiable and static mindset.80 For the law professors,
Americans subscribe less to a mindset than to a particular set of views, and
that particular set of views can (and has) undergone significant revision over
time. 8'
This first difference leads to a second, which involves the additional
work that the term consensus performs for consensus constitutionalists. For
these legal scholars, consensus describes not only a mindset, but also a process of constitutional interpretation. Thus, consensus constitutionalists
believe that, when the American people reach extremely broad agreement on
a particular issue, the Supreme Court will almost inevitably issue an opinion
in accordance with that extremely broad agreement.82 The Court's opinion
may slightly precede or slightly follow the crystallization of consensus, but
the Court resists articulating public consensus only at its own peril.
A. Identifying Consensus Constitutionalism
Unlike consensus historians writing during the 1950s, who did not
generally invoke the term consensus in describing American unity, consensus
constitutionalists repeatedly avail themselves of that term-and of the undergirding ideology. For consensus constitutionalists, the notion of consensus
does not, moreover, act as a marginal phenomenon. Rather, consensus acts
as the central analytical device, as it encapsulates their core theory of how
Supreme Court Justices interpret the Constitution. 8 3 When American citizens
have reached (or, alternatively, are poised to reach) consensus regarding a
particular issue, Supreme Court Justices amplify that consensus through constitutional interpretation. This process occurs, according to consensus legal
scholars, because many of the most important provisions in the Constitution
contain indeterminacy. The Fifth Amendment's demand for "due process of
law," the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual
punishments," and the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of "equal
80. See Higham, supra note 15, at 95 ("(W]e are told [by consensus historians] that America in
the largest sense has had one unified culture.").
81. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 12, at 3-4 (identifying parallels between the development of
Supreme Court doctrine and changes in public opinion); SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 4-5 (arguing
that an array of Supreme Court antidiscrimination decisions reflect endorsement of advancements in
popular thinking).
82. For nineteenth-century scholarly adumbrations of this view regarding the public's influence
on law, see DAVID M. RABBAN,

LAW'S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND

THE

TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY ch. 11 (forthcoming 2011 Cambridge University Press)

(manuscript on file with the author) (observing that several leading American legal scholars during
the late nineteenth century believed that "evolving custom is the ultimate basis for constitutional
law" and that "[w]hen evolving custom advances beyond existing law ... the law must change").
83. As the text above states, I am principally concerned with identifying and critiquing the core
theory that unites consensus constitutionalism. The group of scholars identified here as subscribing
to this school sometimes strike slightly different notes of emphasis and include minor qualifications
of their overarching theory. Although I periodically address these modest differences and
qualifications, I primarily address the main lines of their analyses.
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protection"-to name only a few phrases-all demand considerable interpretive work.
Supreme Court Justices give content to the document's
indeterminate phrases by (both consciously and unconsciously) ascertaining
the consensus views of their fellow citizens, and then imposing that view
through their decisions.
Klarman's From Jim Crow to Civil Rights contains an early and
particularly lucid expression of the consensus-constitutionalist thesis. The
passage, which arrives toward the book's conclusion, merits quoting at
length:
Most of the Court's race decisions considered in this book imposed a
national consensus on a handful of southern outliers. Reading
dominant public opinion into the Constitution is a natural temptation
for any interpreter. When people strongly favor a particular policy
about which the Constitution offers no determinate guidance, they are
understandably inclined to construe the document to support that
policy. Because the justices broadly reflect society, if most people
feel strongly about a particular policy, it is likely that most justices
will as well.
They will then face the same temptation to
constitutionalize the position that they support as a policy matter.84
The "tendency to constitutionalize consensus and suppress outliers," accord85
ing to Klarman, is far from limited to the Court's decisions regarding race.
Rather, in a sweeping manner reminiscent of Hofstadter's expansive and illfated introduction, Klarman contends the trend can be broadened to explain
wide swaths of constitutional law. "This book argues that because constitutional law is generally quite indeterminate," Klarman explains,
''constitutional interpretation almost inevitably reflects the broader social and
political context of the times . . . .

In the absence of determinate law,

constitutional interpretation necessarily implicates the values of the judges,
which themselves generally reflect broader social attitudes."8 7
Other consensus constitutionalists similarly invoke the term consensus
and the accompanying understanding of how the Court functions. Friedman
embraces the consensus framework in the conclusion to The Will of the
People to explain the Court's increased commitment to racial equality during
the twentieth century:
Consensus was a long time developing, but when it did, the justices'
interpretation of the Constitution gave way to popular will. The
justices in Brown v. Board of Education argued they were protecting

84.
85.
86.
87.

KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 453.
Id. at 453-54.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 5-6.
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constitutional rights, but once again it was evolving national views
that supported the Court's judgment and enabled its enforcement.8 8
Sunstein's A Constitution of Many Minds also embraces consensus as a
crucial dynamic in explaining how the Supreme Court operates. "[T]he
Court is much more tightly connected to public consensus than we often
acknowledge," Sunstein explains.89
"Those who like popular
constitutionalism, or who believe that most people are likely to be right,
should be comforted to find that when the Court innovates, it almost always
does so in a way that is responsive to a widely held social judgment, or one
that is clearly emerging." 90 Finally, related to Sunstein's last point, Rosen's
The Most Democratic Branch cautions the Supreme Court about "trying to
anticipate a constitutional consensus that has not yet occurred." 91
Consensus constitutionalists repeatedly emphasize that Supreme Court
Justices are products of the times in which they live. In an effort to explain
why the Court generally imposes consensus ideals upon the nation, Sunstein
contends that "[p]erhaps [the] most important" explanation is that "members
of the Court are part of the society whose constitution they interpret." 9 2
Friedman has similarly claimed, "Like all the other segments of society,
courts simply are, and will remain, participants in American political life."93
Klarman, who appropriately (but too intermittently) observes that Justices are
drawn from an elite strata of society,94 nevertheless suggests that the
significance of the judiciary being composed of elites is likely trumped by
the nation's overall social milieu. "Though the culturally elite values of the
justices open space for them to deviate from popular opinion in their
constitutional interpretations," Klarman writes, "that space is limited. The
fact that the justices live in the same historical moment and share the same
88. FRIEDMAN, supranote 11, at 381.
89. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 142.
90. Id Even that supposedly staunch defender of minority rights-the Warren Court-can, in
Sunstein's estimation, be more accurately understood as an articulator of national consensus: "For
all its aggressiveness, the Warren Court can itself be seen, most of the time, as reflecting rather than
spurring social change." Id. Sunstein does, to his credit, acknowledge that no consensus exists in at
least some constitutional cases. "If there is a consensus within the relevant community on a
question of law, or on a question that bears on the right answer to a question of law, then judges
should pay attention to that consensus," Sunstein explains. Id. at 176. "But in hard constitutional
cases, a consensus will be rare, and judges will in any case be unlikely to want to rule in a way that
rejects it." Id. Sunstein's book-taken as a whole-seems to contend that such hard constitutional
cases seldom arise.
91. ROSEN, supra note 12, at 200.

92. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 142. Sunstein continues: "They are unlikely to interpret that
constitution in a way that society as a whole finds abhorrent or incomprehensible." Id.
93. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 581 (1993).
94. See KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 452 (contending that Brown may have been decided when
it was because racially egalitarian views were more widespread among elites in 1954 than among
the nation as a whole); id. at 6 (noting that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, "most
justices continue to regard ... prayer [in public schools] as unconstitutional, even though 60-70
percent of Americans disagree").
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culture as the general population is probably more important to their constitutional interpretations than the fact that they occupy a distinct
socioeconomic subculture."95
Viewing the Justices alongside their fellow citizens leads consensus
constitutionalists to a rare gesture toward the significance of constitutional
text: "We the People."96 As its title suggests, Friedman's The Will of the
People strikes the populist chord with particular force. "Ultimately, it is the
people (and the people alone) who must decide what the Constitution
means," Friedman writes. 9 7 "Judicial review provides a catalyst and method
for them to do so. Over time, through a dialogue with the justices, the
Constitution comes to reflect the considered judgment of the American
people regarding their most fundamental values." 98 In a similar vein, Rosen
contends, "The courts can best serve the country in the future as they have
served it in the past: by reflecting and enforcing the constitutional views of
the American people." 99 Even in the absence of judicial review, Sunstein
contends that popular views shape modem constitutional understandings.10 0
The prevailing conception of executive power in the field of national
security, Sunstein writes, "is a product of judgments of a variety of persons
and institutions and, in an important sense, of We the People."' 0 1
Friedman advances an unusually hardy version of the claim that society
controls constitutional interpretation. Although the Court may-as a formal
matter-issue judicial decisions, Friedman contends that the American people will eventually, through an ongoing dialogue with the Court, conjure the
constitutional interpretations that they favor. "The magic of the dialogic
system of determining constitutional meaning ... is that it works whether the
judges rule properly or not-precisely because everything important happens
after they render their decision," Friedman explains.1 0 2 "What history shows
is assuredly not that Supreme Court decisions always are in line with popular
opinion, but rather that they come into line with one another over time." 0 3
Friedman views this process of constitutional interpretation as an iterative
one, where the people ultimately will have their way: "It is through the process of judicial responsiveness to public opinion that the meaning of the

95. Id at 452.
96. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
97. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 367.

98. Id. at 367-68. Friedman's book brims with such sentiments. Consider only one more: "The
American people signaled their acceptance ofjudicial review as the proper way to alter the meaning
of the Constitution, but only so long as the justices' decisions remained within the mainstream of
popular understanding." Id. at 196.
99. ROSEN, supra note 12, at 210.
100. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 4.
101. Id
102. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 382.

103. Id.
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Constitution takes shape. The Court rules. The public responds. Over time,
sometimes a long period, public opinion jells, and the Court comes into line
with the considered views of the American public."'1' Klarman possesses a
similar-though less extravagant-understanding of the close connection
between the views of the American people and Supreme Court decisions.
"[I]f the Court's constitutional interpretations have always been influenced
by the social and political contexts of the times in which they were rendered,
perhaps it is impossible for them not to be," Klarman writes. 105 "If that is so,
then arguing against the inevitable seems pointless."106
The people's constitutional views, according to the consensus
constitutionalists, can generally be obtained by examining public opinion.
"In the modem era," Friedman explains, "the supposed tension between popular opinion and judicial review seems to have evaporated." 07 Although the
meaning of "public opinion" has changed dramatically over time,' 08 consensus constitutionalists appear to use that term interchangeably with polling
data.' 09 "[T]he Supreme Court has rendered decisions that meet with popular
approval and find support in the latest Gallup poll," Friedman writes." For
his part, Klarman favors the phrase "dominant public opinion" to Friedman's
unmodified version: "Constitutional law generally has sufficient flexibility to
accommodate dominant public opinion, which the justices have little inclinaWhen facing "dominant public
tion, and limited power, to resist.""'
Justices are powerless to act.
Court
Supreme
contends
opinion," Klarman
"The justices reflect dominant public opinion too much for them to protect
truly oppressed groups.""12
Consensus constitutionalists use strikingly similar language to describe
role. The Supreme Court not only identifies "consensus,"'" 3 but
judicial
the

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 383.
KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 449.
Id.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 15.
See William E. Forbath, The Will of the People?-Pollsters,Elites, and Other Difficulties,

78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1191, 1195-1202 (2010) (tracing the varied meanings that the term "public
opinion" has assumed).
109. Consensus constitutionalists sometimes express qualms about using polling data to
indicate the people's will. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 17; ROSEN, supra note 12, at 9; SUNSTEIN,
supra note 13, at 211. These qualms are brushed aside, however, as consensus constitutionalism
often places considerable weight upon polls to support its points.
110. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 14; see also ROSEN, supra note 12, at 109 ("[A]n opinion
along these lines would have been consistent with public opinion: in May, 2003, 60 percent of
respondents in a Gallup poll said homosexual conduct between consenting adults should be legal.").
111. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 449.
112. Id.
113. E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 149, 381; KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 124, 146, 310,
453; ROSEN, supra note 12, at 13, 15, 41, 42, 89, 109, 124, 142, 196, 203; SUNSTEIN, supra note 13,
at 142, 176.
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it then takes that consensus and brings state "outliers"l 14 into line with
"national values.""' Justices who wish to avoid "defiance" 1 l 6 of their rulings
and to preserve the Court's "legitimacy"' 17 steadfastly issue decisions consonant with "public opinion."' 18 Some consensus constitutionalists suggest,
moreover, that judicial decisionmaking amounts to the ratificationof popular
views. Friedman contends that Supreme Court decisions "serve as a catalyst,
to force public debate, and ultimately to ratify the American people's considered views about the meaning of their Constitution."ll 9 Sunstein makes the
same point: "The authority of the national government is a product of democratic processes, not of the federal judiciary; the Court's role has been largely
to ratify what citizens and their representatives have done." 2 0
Before critiquing consensus constitutionalism, it should prove helpful
to explain briefly how that concept differs from two prominent, somewhat
related ideas regarding the judicial function. Consensus constitutionalists
sometimes invoke political scientist Robert Dahl's classic work on the
Supreme Court.1 21 Admittedly, consensus constitutionalists and Dahl are
united in believing that the Court should not be viewed in utter isolation from
the American public.
Along three axes, however, consensus
constitutionalism meaningfully departs from the Dahlian perspective. First,
where consensus constitutionalism is predicated upon the views of the
American people, Dahl's theory primarily addressed a narrower class of "the
political elite." 2 2 Dahl made clear when he suggested the Court cannot long
114. E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 260, 286; KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 85, 124, 137,
236, 458-59; ROSEN, supra note 12, at 13, 124, 203.
115. E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 273. See also KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 124

(discussing "national norms"); SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 167, 177 (discussing "social values").
116. E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 61, 377; KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 210, 314, 317,

320, 358; ROSEN, supra note 12, at 24, 42.
117.
31, 185,
118.
note 10,

E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 330, 377; ROSEN, supra note 12, at xii, xiii, 8, 13-16,
199, 210.
E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 123, 230, 250, 287, 295, 374-76; KLARMAN, supra
at 6, 16, 21, 37, 39, 129, 140, 232, 264, 447, 450; ROSEN, supra note 12, at xii, 20, 55, 83,

107, 109, 202; SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 142-44, 167, 211-12.
119. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 16; see also id at 381 (contending that the Justices'
constitutional decisions "must be ratified by the American people").
120. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 4.
121. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National

Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). For consensus-constitutionalist invocations of Dahl, see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 260; ROSEN, supra note 12, at 6.
122. See Dahl, supra note 121, at 291 (voicing skepticism that the Supreme Court selection
process yields "justices [who] would long hold to norms of Right or Justice substantially at odds
with the rest of the political elite"). It is this emphasis on the role of governing elites that prevents
Lucas A. Powe Jr.'s constitutional history from being included in the consensus camp. Although
Friedman and Powe both issued one-volume histories of the Supreme Court within a few months of
each other in 2009, the titles of the two works go a long way toward appreciating the considerable
differences between the aims of the two scholars. Where Friedman's The Will of the People reveals
its avowedly populist approach, Powe's The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789-2008

reveals its effort to chronicle not the American people as a whole, but instead a particularly
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resist the dominant views of "lawmaking majorities" that he used that term to
indicate "a majority of those voting in the House and Senate, together with
the president."l23 Second, where consensus constitutionalism advances a
weak conception of the Court's ability to resist majority preferences, Dahl's
assessment of judicial capacity can be seen-at least compared to consensus
constitutionalism's-as potent. 124 "The Supreme Court is not ... simply an
agent of the [governing] alliance," Dahl wrote. 12 5 "It is an essential part of
the political leadership and possesses some bases of power of its own, the
most important of which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution."1 26 Dahl further suggested that the Court may play
an effective policymaking role when its views do not clash with the norms of
elected officials: "[A]t very great risk to its legitimacy powers, the Court can
intervene in such cases and may even succeed in establishing policy.
Probably in such cases it can succeed only if its action conforms to and
reinforces a widespread set of explicit or implicit norms held by the political
leadership .... "127 Third, where consensus constitutionalism understands the

Court to articulate the views of an American consensus, Dahl noted the role
of "conflict" in judicial decisionmaking.1 2 8

influential subset of the population. Powe's earlier constitutional history has also explicitly sought
to chronicle elite views of governing coalitions, rather than the views of American citizens in their
entirety. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS xv (2000) ("I

hope to eschew the law professor's traditional Court-centered focus and instead place the Court
where it belongs as one of the three co-equal branches of government, influencing and influenced
by American politics and its cultural and intellectual currents."). Powe's analysis occasionally
struck the chords of consensus constitutionalism, but such occasions do not make up his
scholarship's analytical core.
123. Dahl, supra note 121, at 284; see id. at 283-84 (expressing skepticism about the wisdom
of extrapolating from lawmaking majorities to a national majority).
124. Dahl's view ofjudicial capacity, it bears mentioning, is potent only in a comparative sense.
See id. at 293 ("By itself, the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy.").
Although Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope surely influenced the thin conception of judicial
capacity espoused by consensus constitutionalists, his work is largely distinct from the school of
thought under review. Rather than portraying the Court as an institution that translates the People's
views into law, Rosenberg-perhaps due to his training as a political scientist-viewed the Supreme
Court principally as a branch of government. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 71

(1991) ("Only when Congress and the executive branch acted in tandem with the courts did change
occur .. . . In terms of judicial effects, then, Brown and its progeny stand for the proposition that
courts are impotent to produce significant social reform.").
For an argument that Rosenberg and Klarman both afford insufficient credit to law's
transformative power, see generally David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist

Devaluing ofBrown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 151 (1994).
125. Dahl, supra note 121, at 293.
126. Id
127. Id at 294. For a recent empirical study exploring congressional restraints on Supreme
Court decisionmaking, see Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Congress, the
Supreme Court, andJudicialReview: Testing a ConstitutionalSeparationofPowers Model, 55 AM.

J.POL. SCI. 89 (2011).
128. See Dahl, supra note 121, at 294 (contending that the Court is no exception to the rule that
"policy ... is the outcome of conflict, bargaining, and agreement among minorities").
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It also merits exploring how consensus constitutionalism parts company
with popular constitutionalism.1 29 Consensus scholars believe that ordinary
people play a role in constitutional interpretation, but that this role is indirect.
For consensus constitutionalists, Justices continue to be charged with interpreting the document-at least in the first instance. Thus, American legal
history reveals, in Professor Friedman's phrase, a type of "mediated popular
constitutionalism."' 3 0 The decisions that result from mediated popular
constitutionalism effectively remove some of the thorns from the
phenomenon that Alexander Bickel famously dubbed the "countermajoritarian difficulty."'31 Unadulterated popular constitutionalists, in sharp
contrast to their mediated cousins, principally advocate that everyday people
should directly interpret the Constitution's text.13 2 Popular constitutionalists
would, consequently, draw little solace from having Justices perform the
work that citizens should perform for themselves. 33
B. CritiquingConsensus Constitutionalism
Three central problems undermine the consensus constitutionalists'
claim that the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution in a manner that re-

129. The leading scholarly accounts of popular constitutionalism are: LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); RICHARD D.
PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994); and
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). For important
critiques of the movement, see generally Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?
Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005); L. A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People" Missing in
Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (2005) (both reviewing KRAMER,
supra).
130. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596,
2610-13 (2003) (emphasis added) (contending that courts consider popular beliefs in resolving
constitutional disputes).
131. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962). Professor Bickel, sounding
much like today's consensus constitutionalists, stated that one function of judicial review is to
"declar[e] an existing national consensus; that it is to enforce as law only the most widely shared
values, so widely shared that they can be said to have the assent of something like Calhoun's
concurrent majorities." Id. at 239. Notably, Bickel-like Dahl-espoused a comparatively broad
understanding of the Court's ability to shape public opinion. "The Court is a leader of opinion, not
a mere register of it," Bickel wrote. Id. Here, too, it is important to understand that Bickel's notion
of the Court's ability to resist majority preference is broad only in comparison to his intellectual
heirs; indeed, Bickel contended that the Court "must lead opinion, not merely impose its own;
and-the short of it is-it labors under the obligation to succeed." Id.
132. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 129, at 247 ("The point, finally, is this: to control the
Supreme Court, we must first lay claim to the Constitution ourselves. That means publicly
repudiating Justices who say that they, not we, possess ultimate authority to say what the
Constitution means.").
133. It also bears mentioning that popular constitutionalists often emphasize societal conflict
between elites and nonelites. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 653, 655 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 129) ("As Kramer sees it, American
constitutional history is riven by this conflict between the legal aristocracy and popular
democracy.").
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flects the views of the American people. First, the claim often imputes a
unity of thought to American society that conceals the deep cleavages that
exist among citizens regarding many constitutional questions. Second, the
claim mistakenly portrays Supreme Court Justices (and the opinions they
issue) as being almost inevitably in step with the citizens they help to govern.
Third, the claim encourages Justices to believe that it is nearly impossible for
the Court to protect rights that only a minority of citizens favors and, thus, to
behave in a generally conservative fashion-lest they get too far out in front
of the American people.
1. America, United.--Consensus constitutionalists insist that the
Supreme Court be understood and evaluated in a historically contextualized
manner. In this sense, their scholarship converges with one of the more important developments to have occurred in the field of history during the last
five decades: the move toward social history. Instead of viewing the past as
a series of events shaped singularly by "Great Men," historians have increasingly written works that attempt to chronicle the lives of ordinary
citizens.134 In language that can be understood to speak for the consensus
school more broadly, Friedman explains: "Typically, histories of the
Supreme Court focus on the justices and their decisions. Here, however, the
But consensus
chief protagonists are the American people."' 35
constitutionalists clash with much modern historical writing because they
replace an excessive emphasis on individuals with an excessive emphasis on
a too often undifferentiated collective. Although consensus constitutionalists
claim that the people exercise firm control over constitutional interpretation,
the people simultaneously may want many different things-and sometimes
they may not know what they want.
When the Court interprets the Constitution, it does not typically
articulate popular consensus, if for no other reason than because doing so is
typically not an option. A national consensus (even loosely defined) is
simply nonexistent on many constitutional questions that reach the Court.
From the nation's founding, Americans have held competing and
contradictory conceptions of what the Constitution permits and what the
Constitution requires.1 "[T]he practical crisis of a legal order comes when

134. Prominent examples of social history abound. See, e.g., JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE
SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1972); STEVEN HAHN, A
NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY
TO THE GREAT MIGRATION (2003); JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW:
BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985).
135. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 16.
136. See Sanford Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, HARPER'S, May 1977, at 35, 40
(listing examples of groups and issues where disputes exist regarding the "conceptions of justice,"
including: masters and slaves; the military during World War II and Japanese-Americans; and
abortion).
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fundamentally different values are asserted within the political realm, so that
one person's notion of justice is perceived as manifest tyranny by someone
else," Sanford Levinson explained in 1977, noting that "[t]he lack of
common interest between master and slave is obvious." 1 3 7 Such fundamental
disputes are far from limited to the past. But consensus constitutionalism
risks transforming America's motto-e pluribus unum-from an aspiration
into a statement of fact. "Our present reiteration of the need for the rule of
law is eloquent testimony to our yearning for a genuine national
community," Levinson explained.' 3 8 "[W]e mistake it at our peril, however,
if we regard it as a reality." 39 Instead of articulating consensus, then, the
Supreme Court is-to put the point bluntly-in the business of selecting
winners and losers.140 And it is misleading to pretend that we are all (or even
nearly all) on the same team.
The notion of constitutional consensus also suggests that the American
people have dedicated time to contemplating a particular question and have
resolved their feelings about the question in a definitive manner. Friedman
strikes this note with considerable force, contending that "as Americans have
the opportunity to think through constitutional issues, Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the considered judgment of the American
people."' 4 1 That may well accurately characterize what occurs on occasion,
but citizens surely do not approach many constitutional questions (even on
salient issues) in that manner.142 People often feel ambivalent about how a
particular question should be resolved, and may even articulate one view but
conduct their lives in a manner inconsistent with that view. "How does one
isolate and discover a consensus on a question so abstruse as the existence of
a fundamental right?" Louis Jaffe queried more than forty years ago. "The
public may value a right and yet not believe it to be fundamental .... There
may be a profound ambiguity in the public conscience; it may profess to
entertain a traditional ideal but be reluctant to act upon it." 43 Apart from
ambivalence, moreover, many people surely experience apathy regarding
how constitutional questions should be resolved. As Jaffe inquired: "[I]n
many cases will it not be true that there has been no general thinking on the
issue?" 1 "
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id
Id at 41.
Id
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv (1978) (contending that

judicial decisionmaking "inescapably" calls for "taking sides").
141. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 14.
142. Consensus constitutionalists observe intermittently that the Supreme Court possesses
greater leeway to resist the public's preferences on issues of low salience. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN,
supra note 11, at 377; SUNsTEIN, supra note 13, at 179.
143. Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80

HARV. L. REv. 986, 994 (1967).
144. Id.
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Even within their own framework, conflict within society should receive
greater emphasis than consensus legal scholars generally allow. After all, the
very fact that what constitutes the consensus view changes over time means
that there are periods of transition, with some people clinging to the old notion and other people rallying to what will become the new notion. 145 Such
periods must, in some measure, be characterized by dissent and tumult and
disagreement. One prevailing orthodoxy does not simply yield overnight to a
different prevailing orthodoxy. Rather, the transitional process is often prolonged and combative, as individuals seldom cast aside deeply held beliefs
without at least some measure of struggle. The consensus constitutionalists,
however, generally avoid depicting this transitional reality. In their
depiction, American citizens often appear to drift effortlessly en masse from
one consensus to another consensus. While certainly not every single
American is onboard with the consensus, the vessel contains just about
everyone who is decent and thoughtful. Those who are not onboard,
moreover, are dismissed as retrograde outliers. But even those outliers can
be accommodated within the consensus framework by including them as part
of an "emerging national consensus."l 4 6
An "emerging national consensus," however, is another way of putting a
concept that might more accurately be characterized as a "nonexistent
national consensus." If it has yet to emerge, after all, there is no consensus.
Concededly, it is often possible to make fairly accurate assessments regarding which way the political and demographic winds are blowing, perhaps
especially so if the contested issue elicits a stark generational divide. 14 7 Yet
it is important not to assume that such trends will ultimately materialize in
the form of an actual consensus.148 Even after consensus has theoretically
emerged, it merits emphasizing that consensus can-at least on occasionerode. When the Court was in the midst of deciding Roe v. Wade,14 9 for
instance, Justice Harry Blackmun clipped a Washington Post article that
discussed a June 1972 poll revealing that support for abortion rights stood at

145. Cf THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 5-9 (1962)

(analyzing the cyclical nature of paradigm shifts in scientific thought).
146. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 310.
147. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Against Blanket Interstate Nonrecognition of Same-Sex

Marriage, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 205, 218 (2005) (noting the generational divide in public
opinion on same-sex marriage and suggesting that this may ultimately lead to a decline in
opposition to such marriage).
148. In encouraging Justices to exercise great caution before vindicating rights, Professor
Rosen accounts for the possibility of Justices misreading the tea leaves. See ROSEN, supra note 12,
at 200 ("[J]udges are often inept at constitutional futurology, and the backlashes that wrong guesses

tend to provoke may delay the constitutional transformation the judges are attempting to predict.
For this reason, if judges are inclined to anticipate the future, they should confine themselves to
gentle nudges rather than dramatic shoves.").
149. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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a then-unprecedented high of 64 percent.150 In May 2010, however, a Gallup
poll revealed that for the second straight year slightly more Americans categorized themselves as "pro-life" than as "pro-choice." 15' A similar erosion
of what appeared to be an emerging consensus occurred five decades ago
when opposition to the death penalty seemed to be crystallizing into
consensus. In 1960, Time magazine headlined a piece that appeared to
capture the prevailing sentiment: "Capital Punishment: A Fading Practice."l 5 2
Some half a century later, it is now apparent that capital punishment's fadeassuming that it is, in fact, fading-is an unusually prolonged one.153 This
history suggests, then, that although it is occasionally possible to read the
political and demographic winds, those winds sometimes swirl.
The notion of an "emerging national consensus" also exposes that
consensus constitutionalists sometimes seem to espouse what amounts to a
trickle-down theory of ideology. After elite members of society subscribe to
a particular notion, consensus scholars suggest that it will not be long before
that notion becomes accepted by people with less wealth and less
education.15 4 But there is no reason to believe that the views of elites
necessarily must descend the class and educational ladders. It may well
come closer to the mark to suggest that elites sometimes resemble more a
class unto themselves than the shape of things to come. 55
150. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME
COURT JOURNEY 91 (2005).
151. See Lydia Saad, The New Normal on Abortion, GALLUP (May 14, 2010),

http://www.gallup.com/poll/128036/New-Normal-Abortion-Americans-Pro-Life.aspx (noting that
47 percent of respondents were "pro-life" and 45 percent of respondents were "pro-choice").
152. Capital Punishment: A Fading Practice, TIME, Mar. 21, 1960, at 19, available at

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,894775,00.html.
153. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, No More Tinkering: The American Law Institute
and the Death Penalty Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 89 TEXAS L. REv. 353, 355, 360-65

(2010) (observing that, in the nearly six decades since the Advisory Committee to the Model Penal
Code Project voted to recommend abolishing the death penalty in 1951, capital punishment has
decreased but has not yet been eliminated).
154. See KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 308-10 (asserting that the Brown Justices and the rest of
the cultural elite were more opposed to segregation than the general public, but that they were "part
of the larger culture and inhabit[ed] the same historical moment" on the way toward a general
societal opposition to segregation).
155. College graduates, for instance, have long approved of the Supreme Court's decisions
regarding school prayer in higher percentages than people lacking college degrees. See Alison Gash
& Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 62,
71 tbl.3.2, 76 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).

The Court's two avowed originalists have-albeit with very different aims than my ownrepeatedly pressed the point that the Court serves as a mouthpiece for elite views. See, e.g., Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780-81 (2007) (Thomas, J.,

concurring) ("[l]f our history has taught us anything, it has taught us to beware of elites bearing
racial theories."); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's
opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda . . . ."). For a similar caution against elitism in the
academic literature, see generally Lino A. Graglia, ConstitutionalLaw: A Ruse for Government by
an IntellectualElite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 767 (1998).
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Understanding widespread societal views to influence Supreme Court
decisions is, of course, an unobjectionable statement. Although it is tempting
to think that judges simply do what they think is "correct" in the cases before
them, they do not live in isolation from society. At least some of what
shapes a judge's conception of the "correct" decision stems from prevailing
societal notions.156 But the word influence does not fully capture the role that
consensus constitutionalists assign to the people in constitutional
interpretation. Rather than judicial opinions merely being influenced by the
times and by society, it comes closer to the mark to say that consensus
constitutionalists understand judicial opinions to be virtually controlled by
them. For his part, Friedman makes clear his view of society's controlling
role in constitutional interpretation by suggesting that the Court's initial decision is irrelevant to the matter's ultimate resolution; all that matters is that the
Court places the item on the national agenda for the people to decide.157
Although other consensus constitutionalists do not adopt such an
absolutist position, they too seem to credit society's control of constitutional
interpretation. Consider, for instance, Klarman's assessment of the Supreme
Court's performance during the period between World War I and World
War II: "One cannot say whether the Supreme Court's race decisions of the
interwar period were ahead of or behind the pace of extralegal change, but
they certainly were not far out of step in either direction. As the racial attitudes of the country began to change, so did those of the justices."158
Klarman's assessment of Shelley v. Kraemer'5 9 further underscores the way
in which he views Supreme Court decisions as inextricably connected to
popular sentiment. "Shelley was decided in the same year that a national
civil rights consciousness crystallized," Klarman writes.160 Klarman observes that the Court declined to review racially restrictive covenants in

156. To take an obvious example, imagine that a party filed a lawsuit in 1869 contending that
the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provided a federal right to
same-sex marriage. It seems safe to believe that such a claim would have been incomprehensible to
the Justices serving on the Supreme Court during Reconstruction, and would have been dismissed in
short order. In this hypothetical, a judicial decision denying a same-sex marriage claim in 1869
would have been influenced by its times. Probing a little deeper, however, it becomes apparent that
all judicial opinions are influenced by the times in which they are decided. Should the Court
entertain a same-sex marriage claim in the coming years (as appears likely), would it really be
persuasive to suggest that a reasoned opinion either denying the claim or validating the claim was
not influenced by the times?
157. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 382-83 (referring to "[t]he magic of the dialogic
system"). Neil Siegel has suggested that this aspect of Friedman's worldview amounts to "a kind of
Coase Theorem for constitutional theory: regardless of the way the Court interprets the Constitution
and initially assigns constitutional entitlements, Americans will eventually bargain their way
towards an interpretation that reflects their considered judgment as a people." Neil S. Siegel, A
Coase Theoremfor ConstitutionalTheory, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REv. (forthcoming).
158. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 169.
159. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
160. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 215.
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1945, but just three years later the Court issued a unanimous decision prohibiting judges from giving effect to such agreements.16 1 "Rarely have the
justices changed their minds about an issue so swiftly and unanimously. But
then, rarely has public opinion on any issue changed as rapidly as public
opinion on race did in the postwar years."l6 2
Friedman's account of the Supreme Court's two decisions involving
anti-sodomy statutes offers a particularly arresting account of the seemingly
inextricable link between societal views and judicial views:
Gay rights, which raised so much ire among some conservatives
(particularly the religious right) was a screamingly evident case of the
Court's running right along the tracks of popular opinion ....

Prior to

Bowers v. Hardwick, the 1986 decision denying gay claims, gay
organizations had been making headway against societal
discrimination. Then, amid the general conservatism of Ronald
Reagan's 1980s, gay activism engendered its own backlash. Anita
Bryant, previously famous as the advertising personality for the
orange juice industry, launched the first successful repeal of a gay
rights ordinance .. .. Bowers also was decided at the height of public

hysteria about the AIDS epidemic. While polls from 1977 to 2003
showed a steady increase in public willingness to accept the
decriminalization of sodomy, data collected right around the time that
Bowers was decided revealed a sharp reversal in this trend, with only
33 percent of the country supporting legalization.' 6 3
Meanwhile, by the time that the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas'6
in 2003, Friedman notes public opinion had become considerably more critical of criminalizing sodomy.165
There is little reason to believe, though, that Court decisions are so
closely tied to such fleeting blips of polling data. Bowers,'66 it is worth
recalling, was decided by a Court divided 5-4. Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.,
one of the Justices in the majority, famously agonized over his decision in
the case and publicly announced in 1990 that he regretted upholding the antisodomy provision.167 It seems absurd even to intimate that Powell's vote in
Bowers was motivated more by the public's response to AIDS, say, than by
Powell's (mistaken) belief that he had never met a gay person.16 8 On the
161. Id
162. Id
163. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 359.

164. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
165. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 359-60 (describing political, social, and judicial
developments that illustrated increasing acceptance of gays and lesbians).
166. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
167. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 530, 537
(Fordham Univ. Press 2001) (1994) (recounting that Justice Powell struggled intensely with his
decision in Bowers).
168. Id. at 521.
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strongest understanding of this societally mandated view, Justice Kennedy's
statement for the Court in Lawrence that Bowers "was not correct when it
was decided" comes close to being a non sequitur.' 6 9 Calling a Court decision wrong on the day that it was decided is, for consensus constitutionalists,
not wholly dissimilar from calling the clouds wrong for raining. Illconceived judicial opinions, like days of stormy weather, are not to be
criticized; they are to be endured.
Friedman's take on Bowers is illuminating because it demonstrates the
way consensus constitutionalism can comfortably accommodate many cases,
regardless of how they are decided. If the Court had-as was a distinct
possibility 70-invalidated the anti-sodomy statute in Bowers, it is easy to
envision a consensus constitutionalist attributing the decision to an emerging
national consensus regarding the impermissibility of treating homosexuals as
second-class citizens. Consensus constitutionalism, then, is sometimes
marred by a nonfalsifiable approach that prevents assessment of the theory's

validity.17 1
2. The Inevitability of Judicial Decisions.-Given that the consensusbased approach to legal history is predicated on understanding Justices to
march along with society at large, it is not surprising that they also view judicial decisions as seemingly inevitable. Consensus constitutionalists come
dangerously close to viewing Supreme Court decisions as being somehow
foreordained by the zeitgeist. On this telling, in order to know what the
Court will decide on a given constitutional question, one needs to know only
the views of the American people. But consensus constitutionalism's
emphasis on judicial inevitability makes for an unsatisfying approach to
history because it examines the past through the wrong end of the telescope.
Judicial decisions are a good deal more contingent and indeterminate than
consensus constitutionalism allows, and judges have a considerably wider

169. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
170. Klarman, it is worth noting, has suggested that had the Supreme Court invalidated antisodomy statutes in 1986, the decision would not have been countermajoritarian. See Klarman,
supra note 1, at 11 (referencing opinion polls that suggested half of the country would have
supported a contrary result in Bowers).
171. See MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS 105-46 (2010) ("If the Court

invalidates an unpopular policy, it's simply acting against an outlier. If it invalidates a popular one,
it's simply doing what the nation's elites want . . . . There's nothing you can't explain in this

way."). Rendering theories incapable of being disproven is a commonplace practice within legal
academia. For a critique of one such instance in the race-relations arena, see Justin Driver,
Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 104 Nw. U.L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) (contending

that the validity of the interest-convergence thesis cannot be assessed in light of its identification of
"contradiction closing" cases).
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range of viable options open to them than consensus constitutionalism

admits. 172
Although consensus constitutionalists view themselves as being more
attuned to history than other constitutional scholars, they too often advance
an overly determined conception of judicial possibilities that existed in a
particular historical moment. Instead of contemplating and explicating the
range of potential opinions that the Court could have issued at a particular
time, Justices are presented as having only one practical route in deciding a
given case-which is no decision at all. That consensus constitutionalism
even gestures toward history is heartening. But it would be more desirable
still if historically minded legal scholars sought to capture the choices alongside the constraints that pervade Supreme Court decisionmaking.
Because consensus constitutionalists view Court decisions as being
principally driven by the values of the American people, they
underemphasize the role played by judicial personnel in shaping
constitutional understandings. Though liberals today express concern about
the current Court, 17 3 Friedman, for instance, suggests that they need not
worry: "[T]he long-run fate of the Roberts Court is not seriously in doubt; its
decisions will fall tolerably within the mainstream of public opinion, or the
Court will be yanked back into line." 74 This quotation vividly captures how
consensus constitutionalism understands society to place extremely tight
parameters upon the Court's ability to resist popular preferences.175
Sunstein's account of District of Columbia v. Heller17 6 illustrates how
consensus constitutionalists permit societal explanations for judicial
decisions to overshadow explanations involving the Court's composition. In
determining that the Second Amendment protects an individual's-as distinct from a militia's-right to possess firearms three years ago, Sunstein
contends:
[T]he Court was greatly influenced by the social setting in which it
operated, where that judgment already had broad public support. In
recent years, there has come to be a general social understanding that
the Second Amendment does protect at least some kind of individual
right; and that understanding greatly affects American politics.1 77

172. See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 2047, 2070 (2010) (qualifying Professor Friedman's statement that the Court stays within the
"mainstream of public opinion" by noting that "the mainstream of opinion can be a broad current,
encompassing a range of controversial viewpoints").
173. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION
(2010).
174. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 369.
175. See id. at 378 ("The Supreme Court decides few enough cases, and the decisions are of
sufficient import, that interested eyes always are watching the docket.").
176. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
177. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 5.
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Rather than attributing Heller to five Republican-appointed Justices, Sunstein
contends that the Court issued the decision in light of a public consensus regarding firearms: "The Supreme Court's ruling in favor of an individual's
right to bear arms for military purposes was not really a statement on behalf
of the Constitution, as it was written by those long dead; it was based on
judgments that are now widespread among the living."1 7 8 Although Sunstein
does not cite any corroborating polling data, a 2008 USA Today poll verifies
that a large percentage of Americans favored the right conferred by the Court
in Heller.179 Seventy-three percent of respondents contended that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right; just 20 percent of respondents understood the Second Amendment to confer a right only to militias." 0
Was Heller motivated principally by "a general social understanding"
and "judgments that are now widespread among the living"? Or, instead,
was Heller motivated principally by an ideological commitment to firearm
ownership that has emerged to become a part of orthodoxy in elite conservaFinding greater explanatory force in the second
tive legal circles?
explanation would at least have the virtue of helping to explain Heller being
decided 5-4, with the five Justices in the majority all adhering to Federalist
Society precepts more often than each of the four dissenting Justices.18 '
Consensus constitutionalism, with its emphasis on the zeitgeist and its
disregard for judicial ideology, has difficulty accounting for such a voting
pattern. If a magic genie granted an advocate of firearm control a single
wish, would it be wiser to use the wish to: (a) change the minds of 150 million Americans on the meaning of the Second Amendment, or (b) replace a
single conservative Justice in the Heller majority with a judge of one's
choosing? It seems quite probable that the second option would be the prudent course if the goal were to have the Court uphold the District of

178. Id
179. Joan Biskupic, Do You Have a Legal Right to Own a Gun?, USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2008),

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-02-26-guns-coverN.htm.
180. Id. But even this overwhelming disparity in public opinion may not mean, as Sunstein
suggests, that "a general social understanding" exists regarding the Second Amendment's meaning.
Indeed, recent law review issues teem with evidence belying this alleged "general social
understanding." See, e.g., David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble:
Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary

America, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1295, 1295 (2009) (disagreeing with Heller on the Second
Amendment's meaning). Public opinion percentages-even overwhelmingly large percentagescan be misleading. This is so, in part, because polls seldom measure the intensity of the beliefs they
quantify. In other words, people may not only disagree with Heller's interpretation of the Second
Amendment, but many of them may disagree vehemently.
181. Cf Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the ConstitutionalRevolution, 87

VA. L. REv. 1045, 1068 (2001) ("Constitutional revolutions are the cumulative result of successful
partisan entrenchment when the entrenching party has a relatively coherent political ideology or can
pick up sufficient ideological allies from the appointees of other parties.").
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Columbia's firearms ordinance.1 8 2 None of the foregoing should be taken as
discounting the role that social movements may play in influencing constitutional interpretation.'83 It is, however, to suggest that legal scholars should
not attempt to understand outcomes in Supreme Court cases primarily by examining the attitudes of 300 million Americans toward constitutional
questions when they can get a better read by paying attention to the attitudes
of just nine.18 4
Consensus constitutionalists also adopt an exceedingly thin conception
of the field of law itself. Indeed, the triumphant manner in which some consensus scholars trumpet the democratic influence upon constitutional
interpretation makes it tempting to lose sight of the fact that the consensus
school seems to believe that law is simply politics by another name.' 85 A
Justice's job does not, of course, involve merely applying existing law to
new facts in order to derive legal conclusions. To the contrary, judging often
calls for the exercise of judgment--especially when dealing with the
Constitution's open-ended clauses. Acknowledging this reality, however,
does not mean believing that constitutional interpretation is divorced from
text, precedent, and principle, or that political considerations alone give content to law's indeterminate provisions. When judges hear cases, in other
words, they do not fly by the seats of their robes and allow themselves invariably to get swept up in whatever happens to be the moment's prevailing
mood. Among other tasks, Justices examine constitutional text and structure,
parse prior cases, contemplate historical practices, and think about the conse-

182. "Quite probable" does not, of course, mean "certain," as many members in good standing
on the legal left have come around to the view that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Liberal Casefor Gun Rights Helps Sway FederalJudiciary, N.Y.

TIMES, May 6, 2007, at Al (analyzing liberal support for individual Second Amendment rights and
including Akhil Amar, Sanford Levinson, and Laurence Tribe among "leading liberal constitutional
scholars" espousing that belief).
183. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,

122 HARV. L. REv. 191, 192-93 (2008) (arguing that the decision in Heller was based on
"understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged in the late twentieth century through
popular constitutionalism" as opposed to originalism).
184. Nothing here, of course, should be taken as contending that the Justices can be understood
in utter isolation from the cultures (legal and otherwise) that produced them and that they in turn
produce. Cf Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003) (analyzing the interrelated

nature of law and culture). Indeed, the appointment of a Justice can usefully be understood as an
instance where a particular political regime attempts to transform its views into law. See TUSHNET,
supra note 129, at 106-12; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 181, at 1068.
185. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND
POLITICS INCONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125 (2009) (observing that the "belief that constitutional law is

not really law at all, but politics, is also becoming more explicit in the work of some constitutional
scholars"); Suzanna Sherry, Politics and Judgment, 70 Mo. L. REV. 973, 977 (2005)
("Contemporary critics of judicial review ... view constitutional questions not as legal questions
but as political ones.").
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quences of ruling in a particular manner.' But to contend that constitutional
interpretation in all but the most straightforward cases contains virtually no
craft or content is to revive a peculiar form of a practice that was once
labeled "trashing."l 87
Consensus constitutionalism's assertion that Justices are products of
their times, moreover, leads to a distorted understanding of judicial capacity.
On a superficial level, of course, this statement is completely
unobjectionable. On another level, though, this notion seems to border on
the tautological. What, precisely, would it mean to have a Justice who was
not a product of the times in which he or she lived? Can a Justice actually be
produced by another time?188 The very questions sound like nothing so much
as a conceit from a science-fiction film. By this statement, the consensus
constitutionalists must mean a good deal more than that Justices do not possess the ability to travel across time. Yes, Justices' conceptions of law and
morality are surely influenced by the times in which they live. But American
society contains a widely diverging range of opinions on many questions at
any particular time. Members of the same society and even members of the
same class can and do hold radically competing conceptions regarding what
is good for society. After all, despite being drawn from an elite subset of
American society, Supreme Court Justices articulate a relatively broad array
of viewpoints. Consensus constitutionalists have, in sum, too often depicted
Justices as operating in more ideologically constrained societal circumstances than actually existed during their careers. 189
The emphasis on contextual limitations that consensus constitutionalists
generally espouse also spurs them to evaluate Justices-and the opinions
they write-in a manner that is, above all, nonjudgmental.190 In contrast to
legal scholars who praise judicial decisions that they like and condemn judi186. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) (identifying the

modalities of "constitutional argument").
187. See generally Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
188. There may be no stronger rebuttal to these rhetorical questions than the very existence of
Justice David Hackett Souter. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF
THE SUPREME COURT 43 (2007) (noting that Souter "had the habits of a gentleman from another
century. During the day, he would leave the lights off in his office and maneuver his chair around
the room, reading briefs by the sun.").
189. See Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration:The Case of

ProfessorSchmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1622, 1629 (1986) (criticizing Schmidt for not "judging the
justices in a broader context that would have placed higher demands upon their conduct").
190. Among consensus constitutionalists, Sunstein's book affords the most room for judges at
least to contemplate undercutting majority preferences. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 215
("Of course judges are not going to rule in a social vacuum; they live in the world. But those who
live in the world sometimes do best if they ask, with some seriousness, whether a challenged
practice really is justified, not whether most people like it."); id at x ("In many areas of
constitutional law, judges should pay respectful attention to the considered judgments of their
fellow citizens. But in some of the hardest cases, again in the domain of equality, the judgments of
We the People are a product of confusion or bias."). The general thrust of the book, alas, counsels
against that tack.
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cial decisions that they dislike, consensus constitutionalists often adopt the
pose of neutral arbiters. It makes little sense either to applaud or to boo judicial decisions and their authors, after all, if these decisions simply reflect the
times in which they were issued. It may feel gratifying to attack the moral
shortcomings of prior generations when that immorality appears in the form
of legal doctrine, but such attacks make for shoddy history if they are leveled
without regard to the historical context in which those decisions are issued.
As Klarman explains in his book's introduction:
One implication of this perspective on constitutional interpretation is
that the justices are unlikely to be either heroes or villains. Judges
who generally reflect popular opinion are unlikely to have the
inclination [to issue countermajoritarian decisions], and they may well
lack the capacity, to defend minority rights from majoritarian
invasion.19 1
Klarman subscribes to this theory so ardently that he seriously contemplated
calling his book Neither Hero Nor Villain, rather than From Jim Crow to
Civil Rights.1 92
Klarman has contended that railing against anticanonical cases
constitutes not merely cheap moralizing but a dangerous form of selfdelusion. He has decried what he regards as the "pervasive tendency to reflect upon constitutional issues in light of today's deeply-ingrained
assumptions and social context, rather than seriously endeavoring to reconstruct the past horizons of those judges actually charged with resolving
constitutional disputes." 93 Instead of dismissing Plessy v. Fergusonl94 as "a
product of racist judging,"' 95 he contends that constitutional scholars should
instead stress that the decision was a product of its times. "Background
social, political, economic, and ideological forces created a climate within
which judicial invalidation of a railway segregation law would have been
dramatically countermajoritarian, and indeed virtually unthinkable," Klarman
suggests.196 "The Plessy decision was, indeed, so fully congruent with the
dominant racial norms of the period that it elicited little more than a collective yawn of indifference from a nation that would have expected precisely
that result from its Supreme Court."' 9 7 Deploying similar analysis, Klarman

191. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 6.
192. See Michael Klarman, Neither Hero Nor Villain: The Supreme Court, Race, and the

Constitution in the Twentieth Century (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Working Papers
Series, Working Paper No. 99-3a, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-169262.
193. Klarman, supra note 1,at 31.
194. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
195. Klarman, supra note 1,at 26.
196. Id.

197. Id. at 26-27 ("How can a ruling that could not realistically have come out the other way be
'a grave mistake,' 'ridiculous and shameful,' or 'a catastrophe'?").
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contends Korematsu v. United States'9 8 logically springs from the 1940s era
in which it was decided.1 99
In neither Plessy nor Korematsu was, in Klarman's estimation, "a
contrary outcome realistically possible. Only by ignoring the background
historical context of these decisions can we delude ourselves into thinking
otherwise."200 Whatever the truth of the aphorism that people who do not
know history are doomed to repeat it, 20 1 Klarman believes that historical
knowledge does nothing to inoculate people from the doom of repetition.
Klarman has criticized the pervasive belief among the legally sophisticated
that U.S. citizens have learned a valuable and lasting lesson from the Court's
widely maligned decision in Korematsu. "We pride ourselves on believing
that the Japanese-American exclusion and internment could not take place
today, even under similar wartime exigencies, and that if it somehow did the
Court would rightly strike it down," Klarman wrote.202 Klarman expressed
deep skepticism regarding the proposition that the United States had learned
anything that would not prove ephemeral in the face of national trauma.
"But this interpretation of Korematsu seems quite dubious," Klarman
continued. 203 "Only by ignoring the context in which the military exclusion
order and the executive decree authorizing it were issued can we confidently
conclude that a 'right-thinking' Supreme Court would have invalidated it." 204
Viewing the legal question presented in Korematsu as resulting in the
inevitable validation of the detention program represents a kind of legal
fatalism. That case, it merits emphasizing, was decided by a 6-3 margin.205
If a legal position can garner three votes at the Supreme Court, it does not
seem beyond the realm of the possible that two additional Justices could have
voted to invalidate the program.2 06 Korematsu's three dissenting Justices,
moreover, did not offer milquetoast critiques of the U.S. military policy and
the Court's decision upholding that policy. Rather, the dissenting Justices
critiqued the program in language that sounds stirring to contemporary ears.
Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion, for instance, expressed the ideas of a

198. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
199. See KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 449; Klarman, supra note 1, at 28-29.
200. Klarman, supra note 1, at 31.
201. See GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 82 (Prometheus Books 1998) (1905)

("Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.").
202. Klarman, supra note 1,at 28.
203. Id.
204. Id
205. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225-33 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at
233-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 242-48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
206. Klarman notes the existence of Korematsu's three dissenters, but only to suggest that the
number would have been smaller had the case been decided earlier. Klarman, supra note 1, at 29
("[T]he pressure for internment was so great in early 1942 that one might plausibly question
whether there would have been as many as three dissenters on the Court had Korematsu been
decided while the outcome of the war was still genuinely in doubt, rather than in December 1944.").
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modem racial egalitarian in excoriating the program as "fall[ing] into the
ugly abyss of racism." 2 07 In a similar vein, Justice Roberts referred to the
"so-called Relocation Centers" as "a euphemism for concentration camps." 208
Consensus constitutionalism is admirable to the extent that it can be
understood as encouraging legal scholars to distinguish hindsight-driven
judicial criticisms from judicial criticisms that faithfully recreate a given
time's constraints. But its adherents err by inaccurately diminishing the
range of historical possibilities that exist at a particular historical moment
and by discounting the very real value that stems from maintaining an anticanon of despised cases in constitutional law.209 When legal scholars and the
public criticize decisions from the past (even if they do so in a somewhat
ahistorical fashion), they endeavor to shape and improve the nation's constitutional future. Law professors signal to their students, and simultaneously
remind themselves, that some judicial decisions are so wrongheaded that they
merit scorn and condemnation. A similar process unfolds on the national
stage when nominees to the Court and Senators serving on the Judiciary
Committee inveigh against the evils of Korematsu.2 10 Excoriating judicial
decisions, then, can serve a valuable purpose-one that should not be discarded quite so readily.
Even assuming that some of the vituperation directed at anticanonical
cases contains an element of "presentism," 211 such criticism inculcates the
indispensable lesson that historical assessments unfold (and change) over the
course of decades. This lesson encourages law students, some of whom will
one day become judges and even Justices, to take the long view. Chief
Justice Warren's otherwise honorable legacy is stained by his participation in
the exclusion of Japanese citizens while he served as California's attorney
general during World War 11.212 The way in which United States Senators
roundly vilify Korematsu during confirmation hearings instills in not only the

207. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 230 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
209. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 IHARV. L.
REV. 963, 1018-19 (1998) ("The construction of an academic theory canon is accompanied by the
formation of an 'anti-canon' of cases that any theory worth its salt must show are wrongly
decided."); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 245

(1998) ("Constitutional law . . . has not only a canon composed of the most revered constitutional
texts but also an anti-canon composed of the most reviled ones. Lochner and Plessy are anticanonical cases.").
210. See Adam Liptak, Path to Court: Speak Capably But Say Little, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,

2009, at Al ("Here is the basic script: the nominee is expected to praise Brown ... and deplore
cases like Dred Scott ... and Korematsu . . . .").
211. See V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal

Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955, 992 n.191 (2009) (defining presentism as "the tendency to look at the
past through contemporary eyes").
212. See Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown,
and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 75 (1998) (surveying Chief Justice

Warren's discriminatory actions against Japanese citizens).
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nominee, but the public at large, the lesson that race-based banishment
clashes with the nation's modem constitutional values. 2 13 The point here is
not to contend that a program of ethnic exclusion of U.S. citizens could never
occur after Korematsu. (Such a contention would, in any event, veer too
close toward the inevitable view of history that I seek to challenge.) The ritualized condemnation of Korematsu, however, may well reduce the
likelihood that such an exclusionary program will recur. It is certainly plausible that a desire to avoid reenacting the shameful wartime exclusionary
practices that received validation in Korematsu motivated President
George W. Bush's speech that he delivered on September 20, 2001, just nine
days after the terrorist attacks.2 14 In that speech, of course, President Bush
repeatedly emphasized the need to avoid viewing an entire race or an entire
religion as the enemy of the United States.2 15
3. Normative Implications.-Consensus constitutionalists internally
divide upon whether their work should be read as exclusively describing
historical developments or whether it also contains normative implications.
Rosen and Sunstein, for their parts, have made clear that Supreme Court
Justices not only do (as a descriptive matter) generally follow consensus in
their constitutional interpretations, but that they should (as a normative
matter) almost always be applauded for doing so. Friedman and Klarman, in
contrast, frame their arguments as occupying only the descriptive realm and
eschew drawing normative conclusions. If Justices receive the dire message
about judicial capacity that Friedman and Klarman send, however, their
arguments, too, could be understood as containing normative implications.
Neither Rosen nor Sunstein buries the contention that it is, on the whole,
desirable for the Court to constitutionalize consensus. "My point is that
judges should identify the constitutional views of the people by using whatever combination of the usual methodologies they find most reliable and then
enforce those views as consistently as possible," Rosen writes.216 In his
conclusion, Rosen puts the point categorically: "The courts can best serve the
country in the future as they have served it in the past: by reflecting and enforcing the constitutional views of the American people."2 17 Sunstein
likewise suggests that judges should generally exhibit great caution about

213. See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 209-10 (1993)

(statement of Sen. Paul Simon, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary) (criticizing the Court's deference to
public opinion in that "tragic decision").
214. President Bush's Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress, N.Y. TIMES,

Sept. 21, 2001, at B4.
215. Id. ("The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab
friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them.").
216. ROSEN, supra note 12, at 13.
217. Id at 210.
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issuing potentially divisive rulings. "In unusual but important cases, judges
are likely to have enough information to know whether outrage will exist and
have significant effects, and in such cases they should hesitate before imposing their view on the nation," Sunstein writes. 218
Friedman and Klarman purport merely to describe-rather than to
assess normatively-historical trends in constitutional interpretation.
Friedman poses an open-ended question toward the end of his volume:
What we ought to care deeply about, what we ought to be asking, is
how much capacity the justices have to act independently of the
public's views, how likely they are to do so, and in what situations. Is
the Court even capable of standing up for constitutional rights when
they are jeopardized by the majority? 219
In the concluding chapter of From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, Klarman similarly disclaims drawing prescriptive lessons from the nearly 450 pages of
preceding history that chronicles some seven decades of constitutional
history. "Whether social and political context should play such a large role
in constitutional interpretation is beyond the scope of this book," Klarman
writes. 220
The division between the descriptive and the normative, however,
cannot be maintained quite as tidily as Friedman and Klarman would have it.
The two scholars contend that the Court is nearly powerless to protect minority viewpoints and admonish that judges who attempt to offer such
protection will likely succeed only in inflicting damage upon the judiciary
and may even retard the very cause that they wish to advance. "It simply is
the case that the judiciary's capacity to give the Constitution meaning, to
protect minority rights, always has been limited by popular support for those

218. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 164. Sunstein writes this sentence in the context of discussing
how "Justice Bentham" might resolve cases before him. There is no reason to believe, however,
that Justice Bentham's views on this score deviate appreciably from Sunstein's. Indeed, earlier in
the book, Sunstein (undoubtedly speaking for Sunstein) writes: "I conclude that in unusual but
important cases, judges should indeed hesitate if many people disagree with their initial
inclinations." Id. at 15.
Sunstein has long been on record as suggesting that he believes that law professors, unlike
historians, write history with a normative slant. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 601, 602 (1995) (suggesting that rather than merely "uncovering the 'facts,' . . .
constitutional lawyers, unlike ordinary historians, should attempt to make the best constructive
sense out of historical events associated with the Constitution"); id at 605 ("The historian is trying

to reimagine the past, necessarily from a present-day standpoint, but subject to the discipline
provided by the sources and by the interpretive conventions in the relevant communities of
historians. By contrast, the constitutional lawyer is trying to contribute to the legal culture's
repertoire of arguments and political/legal narratives that place a (stylized) past and present into a
trajectory leading to a desired future.").
219. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 373.
220. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 449. Klarman's scholarly work often disavows normative
implications. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 1,at 24 ("For present purposes, though, the key point is
positive, not normative. . . .").
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decisions," Friedman explains. 22 1 Commentators who worry that judicial
review will stifle democratic preferences and commentators who hold out
hope that judicial review will protect minorities share an "underlying
assumption" that is "deeply problematic": "that the judiciary even has the
capacity of running contrary to the will of the majority." 222 Klarman
contends, "The justices are too much products of their time and place to
launch social revolutions. And, even if they had the inclination to do so,
their capacity to coerce change is too heavily constrained." 223 He further
explains: "Constitutional law generally has sufficient flexibility to
accommodate dominant public opinion, which the justices have little
inclination, and limited power, to resist." 2 24 A Supreme Court Justice who
heeded the historical warnings of consensus constitutionalism would surely
be less willing to protect minority rights, given that doing so would almost
certainly constitute a quixotic effort. At least to the judge's ear, then, the
purportedly descriptive assumes a distinctly normative ring.
The work of Friedman and Klarman also seems to contain not-so-subtle
normative warnings regarding the dangers of judges getting too far out in
front of the public. Friedman writes:
The most telling reason why the justices might care about public
opinion, though, is simply that they do not have much of a choice. At
least, that is, if they care about preserving the Court's institutional
power, about having their decisions enforced, about not being
disciplined by politics. Americans have abolished courts, impeached
one justice, regularly defied Court orders, packed the Court, and
stripped its jurisdiction. If the preceding history shows anything, it is
that when judicial decisions wander far from what the public will
tolerate, bad things happen to the Court and the justices.225
It seems difficult to believe that Justices reading this language and taking it
seriously would not experience great apprehension about issuing decisions
they suspect will prove unpopular. Few Justices welcome the opportunity to
bring "bad things" upon themselves and the institution they serve. Klarman,
commendably, avoids such menacing language. But one lesson of Klarman's
famed "backlash" thesis suggests that the Court may succeed in (temporarily,

221. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 380-81.
222. Id at 370; see id. ("To the extent that the judges have had freedom to act, it has been
because the American people have given it to them. Judicial power exists at popular
dispensation.").
223. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 468.
224. Id. at 449.
225. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 375; see also id at 376 (invoking the political science
terminology of "anticipated reaction," Friedman suggests that "[t]he justices don't actually have to
get into trouble before retribution occurs; they can sense trouble and avoid it. The people do not
actually have to discipline the justices; if they simply raise a finger, the Court seems to get the
message.").
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at least) harming groups it seeks to help.226 Accepting Klarman's account,
reasonable Justices could conclude that the wisest way to aid an oppressed
minority would be to refrain from issuing countermajoritarian decisions and
allow society to proceed at its own majoritarian pace. Justices can perhaps
help minorities mainly, in other words, by simply getting out of the way.
By portraying American history in a manner that underplays significant
and substantial conflict, consensus constitutionalists make it appear that
Justices generally lack the desire (and may well lack the capacity) to issue
opinions that clash with popular preferences. In its boldest articulation, this
theory views the Court as merely bringing a few outliers into line with the
national mainstream. Consequently, judicial opinions that have in actuality
required selecting sides in hotly contested arenas-decisions, that is, that reConsensus
quired some measure of courage-are rendered easy.
constitutionalism's tendency to emphasize ideological homogeneity, where
ideological diversity actually reigned, has the potential effect of imbuing
Justices with an inaccurately high conception of the threshold of societal
agreement that is necessary to issue a decision protecting minority rights. As
a result, if current Justices heed the lesson that consensus constitutionalism
purports to teach, they may prove reluctant to issue decisions protecting
minority rights on divisive questions-even if they believe that the decision
can be legitimately grounded in constitutional law.
Consensus constitutionalists, thus, offer an anemic notion of the
judiciary's capacity to protect minority rights against the majority's will.
Indeed, they suggest that scholars who believe that the Court plays a significant role in checking majority preferences are misguided at best and
delusional at worst. But at the risk of being labeled both a hopeless
"romantic" and "psychological ly]" weak,227 it requires observing that
consensus constitutionalism offers an unduly bleak assessment of the Court's
ability to protect rights favored by only a minority of Americans.2 28 History
emphatically does not reveal that the Court invariably follows in the direction
that the public would lead. Instead, modem history suggests the Court acts
with some frequency as a countermajoritarian force in American society.
Although this Article does not present the occasion to mount an
expansive defense of the claim that courts have often protected disfavored
groups, it bears mention here that the Court not only has offered protection to

226. See KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 385-442; Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change,

and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7, 85-149 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, How Brown
Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 82 (1994) (all arguing that

Brown encouraged southern politicians to espouse hardline views opposing racial desegregation and
eliminated the political space available for racial moderates).
227. Klarman, supra note 1, at 6, 23-24.
228. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,

42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 374 (2007) ("In our view the pendulum has swung too far, from
excessive confidence in courts to excessive despair.").
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minorities, but that it has done so in cases that are of high salience to the
American people. In a forthcoming work, I intend to defend at length the
claim that the Court has in fact offered minorities a "haven[] of refuge." 22 9
Two brief examples from the Court's recent decisions will need to suffice for
present purposes. First, the Court served as a plainly countermajoritarian
entity when it decided Boumediene v. Bush three years ago.230 Indeed, public
opinion polling found that only 34 percent of Americans thought that
noncitizen terrorism suspects being held in Guantanamo Bay should be permitted to use the civilian court system to challenge their detention and 61
percent thought that they should not be permitted to do so. 2 3 ' Even assuming
that terrorism has somewhat declined among Americans' priorities since
September 2001,232 the legal protection afforded suspected terrorists remains
233
a topic capable of evoking intense reactions.23 Second, on the heels of
Boumediene, the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Louisianainvalidated the imposition of capital punishment upon defendants who rape (but do not kill) a
minor. 234 A poll taken after the decision revealed that only 38 percent of respondents opposed capital punishment for rapists of children, and 55 percent
favored the death penalty in such cases.2 35 Kennedy attained its high degree
of salience both because of its sensational subject matter and because Barack
Obama and John McCain denounced it during a closely followed presidential
campaign. Even after the Court decided Kennedy, moreover, it became clear
that the Court and the parties had overlooked that in 2006 Congress revised
the Uniform Code of Military Justice to render military personnel convicted
of raping a child eligible for capital punishment.236 Yet no sustained public
outcry greeted either Kennedy or the Court's refusal to reconsider its decision
in light of a congressional statute passed just two years prior that permitted
the very punishment that Kennedy forbade.
229. Justin Driver, The Supreme Court as Haven of Refuge (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author). Justice Black first characterized courts as "havens of refuge" in his opinion for the
Court in Chambers v. Florida. 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940). Klarman has expressly suggested that
courts do not serve this function. See Klarman, supra note 1, at 17-18 ("[T]he Court identifies and
protects minority rights only when a majority or near majority of the community has come to deem
those rights worthy of protection.").
230. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
231. John Cohen, Behind the Numbers: SCOTUS Gitmo Ruling, WASH. POST (June 17, 2008),

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/2008/06/scotusgitmo-ruling.html.
232. See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005

Term-Foreword:

The Court's

Agenda-and the Nation's, 120 HARV. L. REv. 4, 26 (2006) ("Americans' relative concern about
terrorism has plummeted to levels far below those that existed in the very first months after
September 11.").
233. See Jack Goldsmith, Op-Ed., Don't Try Terrorists, Lock Them Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,

2010, at A17 (lambasting efforts to try terrorists in civilian courts and arguing that the United States
should rely exclusively on military detention).
234. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
235. American Voters Oppose Same-Sex Marriage, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. (July 17, 2008),

http://www.quinnipiac.edu/xl 295.xml?ReleaselD=1 194.
236. Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552(b), 119 Stat. 3136, 3263 (2006).
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Although the centrality of Brown v. Board of Education is certainly
understandable within the narratives of consensus scholars, that case may
well occupy an excessive amount of space in the nation's constitutional
consciousness.237 Even acknowledging that the Court failed to eliminate
America's race problem during the 1950s, that acknowledgment provides
scant guidance regarding whether the Court can affect change in other, less
charged contexts. 2 38 The effort to achieve school desegregation involved
many moving parts and required compliance from many actors-including
judges, school board officials, parents, and children. Judicial decisions generally have a considerably lower degree of difficulty to execute successfully
than was involved in Brown. Contemplate, for example, how much easier it
was to implement Miranda v. Arizona, another controversial decision of the
Warren Court, which called for compliance principally from police
officers.239 Consider, too, how many fewer actors would need to comply in
order to effectuate a hypothetical Court decision invalidating capital
punishment. Believing that the Court could not unilaterally eliminate black
subordination-perhaps this nation's most deep-seated social issue-does
not require believing that the Court is powerless to shape society regarding
less intractable problems. In other words, using Brown to derive conclusions
about law's capacity for change has only slightly less to recommend it than
using cancer to derive conclusions about medicine's capacity for healing.24 0

237. Yes, this Article may well, alas, be regarded as part of the problem rather than part of the
solution on this score. See infra subpart III(A).
238. Klarman's book betrays considerable inconsistency in explaining how broadly the
conclusions it reaches should be understood to extend beyond the racial sphere. In the introduction,
as discussed above, Klarman offers a sweeping statement regarding the book's extensive
applicability. See KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 5-6 ("This book argues that because constitutional
law is generally quite indeterminate, constitutional interpretation almost inevitably reflects the
broader social and political context of the times . . . .

In the absence of determinate law,

constitutional interpretation necessarily implicates the values of the judges, which themselves
generally reflect broader social attitudes."). The book's conclusion-which moves beyond race
cases to incorporate discussions of, inter alia, Pierce v. Society ofSisters, Griswold v. Connecticut,
Miranda v. Arizona, Roe v. Wade, Furman v. Georgia, and the Hawaii Supreme Court's gay

marriage decision from 1993-appears to embrace the seemingly boundless applicability of the
consensus constitutionalist framework. At least one sentence in the book's conclusion, however,
seems to undercut the wisdom of extending the book's insights beyond the racial realm. See id. at
463 ("This lesson may not be applicable outside of the race context, as few social reform
movements in the United States confront regimes that are as totalitarian as was Jim Crow
Mississippi."). Yet, this caution against extrapolating from race arrives at the very end of a
paragraph that contains an extremely broad topic sentence. See id ("One lesson to draw from this
history regarding the consequences of Court decisions is ironic: Litigation is unlikely to help those
most desperately in need."). Taken as a whole, the book militates toward broad applicability.
239. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
240. Cf William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and

Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 71 n.246 (1997) (observing that, although judicially prompted
reforms generally have less practical impact than case law may suggest, certain judicial directives
and rules are easier than others for official actors to sidestep).
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One of the oddities of consensus constitutionalism is the way it tends to
treat the judicial capacity for protecting minority rights as static rather than
dynamic. It seems relatively uncontroversial to venture that the modem
Supreme Court possesses a good deal more power as an institution than, say,
the fledgling outfit that John Marshall joined as Chief Justice in 1801.241 In a
similar regard, today's Court possesses considerably more institutional power
to protect minority rights than the Court of 1950, before it had issued many
landmark and widely hailed decisions that are (accurately or inaccurately)
Although consensus
broadly understood to protect minorities.242
constitutionalists sometimes acknowledge that the Court enjoys diffuse
support, 2 43 they underemphasize that today's Court should-given its enhanced status in American life-enjoy a greater ability to protect minority
rights than it possessed before it issued those landmark decisions. Even if
the consensus constitutionalists believe that the Court's ability to protect
minorities remains quite limited, they would do well to underscore that it
holds much greater capacity than it once did.244
Consensus constitutionalists, to be clear, do not insist that the Court has
never played a countermajoritarian role. They generally acknowledge two
instances where the Court has decided cases in a manner that flatly contravenes the wishes of clear majorities: its invalidation of flag-buming statutes
in Texas v. Johnson,2 45 and its limitation of the role that religion plays in public schools in cases like Lee v. Weisman.2 46 Consensus constitutionalists seek
to explain these instances of the Court's countermajoritarian conduct primarily by noting that, though large majorities of the American public disagree
with these decisions, elite Americans generally believe that they were

241. The enhanced status of the modem Supreme Court forms a major theme of how at least
one current Justice assesses that institution's history. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR
DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW 22-72 (2010) (noting how the Court's decision in Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), was essentially disregarded, but then chronicling the Court's
ensuing reputational ascent during the twentieth century).
242. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 74 (1980) (crediting the Warren

Court with "clearing the channels of political change" and correcting discrimination against
minorities).
243. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 379; Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular
Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2596, 2635 (2003).
244. Among consensus constitutionalists, Professor Friedman addresses the Court's increased
status most prominently. When doing so, however, he quickly notes that the People keep the Court
on an extremely tight leash:
In a sense, today's critics of judicial supremacy are right: the Supreme Court does
exercise more power than it once did. In another sense, though, they could not be more
wrong. The Court has this power only because, over time, the American people have
decided to cede it to the justices. The grant of power is conditional and could be
withdrawn at any time. The tools of popular control have not dissipated; they simply
have not been needed.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 14.
245. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
246. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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correctly decided.247 Given that the Justices are drawn from the elite,
consensus scholars contend that it is not especially surprising that they interpret the Constitution in a manner that imposes the consensus views of their
class upon the nation. 248
This class-based explanation, however, cannot possibly bear the weight
that consensus constitutionalists place upon it. It seems strikingly odd that if
the Justices are in fact merely imposing their class views in the form of constitutional interpretation that these cases should be decided by such razor-thin
margins. Both Johnson and Weisman, after all, were 5-4 decisions. 249
Viewing the Justices as class representatives, then, would seem to require
believing that some Justices either are traitors to their class (to put the point
cynically) or are more closely attuned to the democratic ethos (to put the
point benignly). Even though two changes in Court personnel meant that
only seven Justices played a role in resolving both Johnson and Weisman,
three of those Justices switched sides in the cases. Justice O'Connor and
Justice Stevens went from being democrats in Johnson to being elitists in
Weisman, and Justice Scalia made the journey in reverse. 25 0 A narrative
could perhaps be concocted to explain each Justice's vote in the cases, but it
seems clear that such a narrative would exceed the explanatory power of
class and perhaps even exceed the explanatory power of biography.
It also merits emphasizing that these two cases involved neither arcane
areas of law nor witnessed the Court assist groups that were on the verge of
winning victories in the legislative arena. First, it would be difficult to imagine two cases having greater public salience than Johnson and Weisman.
Few matters arouse greater passion among the American public than patriotism and God. Second, Johnson and Weisman did not involve the Court
stepping in to protect something that could be characterized as an "emerging
national consensus." Indeed, Johnson invalidated flag-burning statutes in an
overwhelming 48 states, 251 and Weisman invalidated prayer at public-school
graduations-an extremely widespread practice.252 If the Court is capable of
offering protection to minorities in such sensitive areas in the face of

247. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 378 ("If a justice is in tune with his peer group, and his
peers have elite views not shared by most of the country, the justice will seem to be going his own
way."); KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 6 (qualifying the notion that judges reflect broader social
attitudes by observing that judges are members of an elite subculture); ROSEN, supra note 12, at 169
(acknowledging that some of the Court's school-prayer decisions are difficult to understand on
majoritarian terms); SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 10 (stating that federal judges "tend to come from
a small segment of a society, limited to lawyers and usually part of a wealthy elite").
248. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 210-l (contending that the elite subculture's
disavowal of Jim Crow contributed to the Court's desegregation opinions).
249. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 579; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 398.
250. Compare Johnson, 491 U.S. at 398, with Weisman, 505 U.S. at 579.

251. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 429 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he laws of 48 of the 50
States ... make criminal the public burning of the flag.").
252. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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vigorous opposition, it seems appropriate to wonder whether the Court's
countermajoritarian capacity is not considerably more formidable than consensus constitutionalism allows.
Consensus constitutionalists also too often express an excessively
narrow conception of the Court's ability to withstand attacks upon its
legitimacy. "If the Court engenders widespread resistance," Friedman
writes, "it threatens its legitimacy; even lower levels of defiance eat away at
its credibility." 2 53 Rosen contends, "Paradoxically, the courts, often derided
as the least democratic branch of government, have maintained their legitimacy over time when they have been more rather than less democratic in
their constitutional views."254 Although Sunstein acknowledges that the
Court may be "unduly sensitive to the risk to its own authority" and allows
that "[j]udicial self-preservation should be only a small part of the picture,"
he nevertheless suggests, "If the Court is concerned about its own place in
the constitutional order, and wants to maintain its legitimacy and power, it
might take account of outrage as a method of self-preservation." 2 5 5
Contrary to consensus constitutionalism, however, judicial decisions
that generate some initial public "defiance" and "outrage" may serve to enhance rather than to diminish the Court's authority. If after a period of open
disagreement with a judicial decision much of the public comes to accept (or
even to applaud) the decision, the Court's reputational authority may
increase-a development that could well enable it to issue subsequent
opinions that promote a constitutional vision that most Americans have yet to
adopt.2 56 In terms of the social optimum, the number of judicial decisions
generating defiance will be greater than zero.257 Too much public defiance of
judicial orders could surely imperil the Court's ability to govern, but consensus constitutionalism tends to presume that defiance is something to be
avoided at all costs. In this spirit, Rosen asserts that the Court may "have an
opportunity to enforce a constitutional principle that neither the president nor
Congress are willing enthusiastically to embrace as long as there is no
danger of active resistance."2 5 8 But the "no danger" standard has dangers of
its own.

253. FRIEDMAN, supranote 11, at 377.
254. ROSEN, supra note 12, at xiii.
255. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 153.

256. This dynamic helps to explain the public celebration of the Court's decision in Brown.
That decision became the most celebrated constitutional decision in Supreme Court history not
despite massive resistance, but because of it. See supratext accompanying note 88.
257. Cf Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
991, 1010-11 (2008) (commending the clarifying power of interbranch conflicts); see also Josh
Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalismand the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1122-28 ( 2011)
(exploring the potential of "separation-of-powers multiplicity").
258. ROSEN, supra note 12, at 200 (emphasis added).
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Any message to the contrary has the potential to act as an extremely
conservatizing force on the judiciary. Judges who subscribe to the consensus
theory of constitutional interpretation may not be intimately familiar with the
degree of divisiveness surrounding many judicial controversies of yesteryear.
Judges are likely, however, to be acutely aware of the intense feelings stirred
by today's divisive issues. Moreover, current controversies are generally
portrayed as morally complicated issues upon which reasonable minds can
differ. To the extent that Supreme Court Justices internalize the tenets of
consensus constitutionalism (and there is at least some evidence that they
have),259 they will move ever more meekly to protect minority rights than
their predecessors.
In reaction to what they regard as the romantic myth of the Court as
countermajoritarian protector of the downtrodden, the consensus
constitutionalists (and many other members of the legal left besides) appear
to have accepted the notion that courts simply cannot protect minority
rights.260 Whereas liberals once erred in thinking that courts could do
everything, they now err in thinking that courts can do just about nothing.
Liberals should concededly not direct all of their hopes for societal advancement at the courts, 2 61 but neither should they believe that the judiciary

259. See SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME

COURT JUSTICE 166 (2003) ("[R]eal change, when it comes, stems principally from attitudinal shifts
in the population at large. Rare indeed is the legal victory-in court or legislature-that is not a
careful by-product of an emerging social consensus."). Discussing one of the most controversial
cases decided by the Court, then-Judge Ginsburg wrote:
Roe, I believe, would have been more acceptable as a judicial decision if it had not
gone beyond a ruling on the extreme statute before the Court. The political process
was moving in the early 1970s, not swiftly enough for advocates of quick, complete
change, but majoritarian institutions were listening and acting. Heavy-handed judicial
intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved,
conflict.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63

N.C. L. REv. 375, 385-86 (1985).
In a forthcoming work, I identify some of the various doctrinal areas-including capital
punishment, substantive due process, and obscenity-in which the Court expressly understands
itself to be imposing consensus on the nation through constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (identifying the existence of a "national consensus" against
the death penalty for minors); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) (examining state
practices to observe "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex"); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (requiring courts to contemplate "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest"). I then criticize that methodology as degrading the judicial function.
See Justin Driver, Courting Consensus (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
260. See ROSEN, supra note 12, at 15 ("[J]udges have tended to maintain their legitimacy and
independence in the past by deferring to the constitutional views of the American people ... [and]
they should continue to do so in the future.").
261. See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 83 (2006) ("Still, I wondered if, in our

reliance on the courts to vindicate not only our rights but also our values, progressives had lost too
much faith in democracy."); Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and ConstitutionalInterpretation,13 U.
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cannot play a significant role in facilitating that advancement.
By
emphasizing judicial fragility and minimizing judicial capacity, consensus
constitutionalism has the regrettable consequence of recommending that
Justices delay recognizing rights of minorities that they believe are
constitutionally grounded.
III. The Contested Constitution
This Part aims to supplant consensus constitutionalism with contested
constitutionalism. Instead of misleadingly overemphasizing the role that (a
generally nonexistent) national consensus plays in Supreme Court
decisionmaking, constitutional history that provides an external perspective
on the judiciary should instead depict more fully and accurately the wide
range of viewpoints and often-clashing ideological perspectives that citizens
hold in the United States. Using the term consensus to describe the ideas of
some 300 million Americans on a particular constitutional question typically
elides more than it exposes.
Contrary to the assertions of consensus constitutionalism, the meaning
of the Constitution usually emerges not from consensus but from
contestation-an ideological conflict that has occurred throughout American
history regarding what the nation's foundational document permits and
requires. Extemalists, who are committed to the idea that everyday people
influence constitutional interpretation, should emphasize that Justices do not
interpret constitutional meaning by waiting for consensus to materialize and
then articulating that consensus viewpoint. Instead, they decide cases in the
often cacophonous context that typifies life within the United States, where
the People are neither of one mind nor of one voice. Constitutional conflict,
moreover, unfolds not only between (and among) various groups of citizens,
but within individual citizens themselves.
Indeed, contested
constitutionalism reveals that even a single person can be of many minds on
a particular constitutional question.
Contested constitutionalism does not, of course, suggest that the Court
invariably-or even generally-sides with the downtrodden members of
society. Such a claim would be absurd. In the pages that follow, however,
this Article does argue that the Court has issued countermajoritarian decisions more frequently than is commonly appreciated today. In so doing, I
intend to acknowledge what I regard as the constitutive relationship of legal
scholarship to Supreme Court decisionmaking. If law professors wish the
Court to have the capacity to resist majority preferences and protect minority
interests, they should tout the instances when the Court has done so rather
than attempt to sweep them under the nation's jurisprudential rug.

PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2011) ("The revolution will not be litigated, just as it will not be

televised, and everyone should know that by now.").
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But even if the Court had never in its history issued a decision that
clashed with majoritarian political preferences, contested constitutionalism
would nonetheless offer a superior framework to understand American legal
history than its consensus-based counterpart. That is so because legal history
attuned to ideological contest more accurately captures the public's relationContested constitutionalism
ship to questions of constitutional law.
encourages legal scholars to explore and to communicate the profound
disagreements and deep cleavages that exist alongside the Supreme Court's
resolution of constitutional questions. Where consensus constitutionalism
minimizes those disagreements and cleavages, contested constitutionalism
deems them essential to comprehending American constitutional history in
its full complexity.262
This Part attempts to restore the role of ideological contestation to its
central place in constitutional interpretation by making two principal points.
First, this Part illustrates the rich diversity of thought that existed within the
United States regarding race in the 1950s and 1960s. Brown, far from articulating a consensus viewpoint or even the view of an emerging consensus,
was decided in a context where apathy characterized the racial attitudes of
the overwhelming majority of citizens. Second, in the context of two claims
regarding marriage, this Part argues that the Court has in fact advanced racial
equality when doing so was not supported by prevailing attitudes (when it

262. Some exemplary work by legal scholars has examined history through the lens of what this
Article refers to as contested constitutionalism. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity
Caricature:A Local Legal History Lesson in the Salience ofIntraracialConflict, 151 U. PA. L.

REV. 1913, 1970 (2003) ("Rather than suggesting that African American communities held a
uniform and easily discernable point of view on Brown, this narrative demonstrates that African
Americans held many points of view about the proper approach to achieving educational equality
over time."); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999)
(examining constitutional development over decades as an arena of contest, and tracing alternate,
reform-minded interpretations of constitutional meaning for economic life, as that meaning is
initially fashioned by social movements, reformers, and scholars, and then reworked and embraced
by lawmakers, and, ultimately, courts); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor
Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1236 (1989) ("[T]he language of law in America is best
conceived as a tradition of discourse with divergent and conflicting strands."); Risa L. Goluboff,
The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609, 1612 (2001)

(observing that during the mid-twentieth century, "'civil rights' did not refer to a unified, coherent
category; the content of the term was open, changing, and contradictory, carrying resonances of the
past as well as of several possible contending futures"); Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights
Lawyering and Politicsin the EraBefore Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 272 (2005) (emphasizing "the

conflicting objectives and perceptions of black lawyers in the era of segregation"); Reva B. Siegel,
ConstitutionalCulture, Social Movement Conflict and ConstitutionalChange: The Case ofthe De
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1329 (2006) ("Typically, it is only through sustained conflict

that alternative understandings are honed into a form that officials can enforce and the public will
recognize as the Constitution.").
For an argument extolling the virtues of conflict and disagreement in the statutory context, see
Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 47, 48-58 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/7/30/leib-serota.html.
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validated the right to interracial marriage 263 ) and that it could do so in the
immediate future (should it hear a case regarding same-sex marriage) without
unduly imperiling its legitimacy.
A.

Restoring Conflict and Complexity to Brown

Consensus constitutionalists view the Court's involvement in the quest
for racial equality during the mid-twentieth century as the imposition of naFriedman suggests that, although
tional norms on regional outliers.
remedying the legal subordination of blacks ranked low among the nation's
priorities for a long time, eventually a national consensus prevailed regarding
racial egalitarianism. 264 "Consensus was a long time developing, but when it
did, the justices' interpretation of the Constitution gave way to the popular
will," Friedman explains. 26 5 "The justices in Brown v. Board of Education
argued they were protecting constitutional rights, but once again it was
evolving national views that supported the Court's judgment and enabled its
enforcement.",2 66 Similarly, in a truly remarkable passage, Klarman's From
Jim Crow to Civil Rights frames the Court's 1954 decision as the codification
of "an emerging national consensus" regarding race:
By the early 1950s, powerful political, economic, social, and
ideological forces for progressive racial change had made judicial
invalidation of segregation conceivable. Slightly more than half of the
nation supported Brown from the day it was decided. Thus, Brown is
not an example of the Court's resistance to majoritariansentiment,
but ratherof its conversion of an emerging national consensus into a
constitutional command. By 1954, the long-term trend against Jim

Crow was clear. Justices observed that segregation was "gradually
disappearing" and that it was "marked for early extinction." They
understood that Brown was working with, not against, the current of
history.267
Elsewhere, Klarman has offered perhaps the pithiest articulation of the consensus school's understanding of Brown: "It thus became increasingly
difficult for one region (the South) to maintain social practices or traditions
(de jure forms of Jim Crow) that deviated significantly from those of the

nation as a whole." 2 6 8

263. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
264. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 381.
265. Id.

266. Id.
267. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 310 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Writing eight years
after the Court decided Brown, Professor Bickel also understood the decision to stem from an
emerging consensus on racial equality. See BICKEL, supra note 131, at 241 ("Even as of 1954,
national consensus on the racial problem was immanent.").
268. Klarman, supra note 1,at 34.
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Sunstein offers a particularly aggressive version of the claim that
national consensus produced Brown, suggesting that white Americans had
lost their taste for racial discrimination well before the Court got around to
invalidating segregation in public schools. The Court, Sunstein notes,
is never acting in a social vacuum. Often it is endorsing, fairly late, a
judgment that has long attracted widespread social support from many
minds. The ban on racial discrimination, signaled above all by the
Court's invalidation of school segregation, attracted strong support in
the nation long before the Court acted.269
Sunstein further contends: "Brown was issued by the Supreme Court, not by
the American public as a whole. But even so, .. . [b]y 1954, the American
public was no longer committed to racial segregation, and there can be little
doubt that most of the nation and its leaders rejected it." 27 0
1. Racial Attitudes During the Brown Era.-The consensus reading of
Brown, which is now commonly understood to offer the leading scholarly
account of the decision,27 1 provides a myopic view of a deeply conflicted
historical context and the judiciary's role in mediating that conflict. An
approach to understanding Brown steeped in contested constitutionalism
requires exploring the racial attitudes of white northerners, white southerners,
and black citizens with greater subtlety and nuance than the consensus
constitutionalists' account generally provides. The following analysis
represents an effort to illustrate the way in which Justices who are deciding
cases typically confront a nation better characterized by conflict than by
consensus. Portraying these conflicts-conflicts that occur between, among,
and even within the nation's regions, groups, and individuals-provides a
richer understanding of American legal history.
a. White Northerners.-Consensus constitutionalism too often
gives the sorely mistaken impression that racial attitudes among white northerners during the 1950s were generally the product of a racially enlightened
worldview. It likely comes closer to the truth to say that many white northerners simply did not dedicate much time to contemplating the treatment of
their fellow black citizens. Among northern whites, the predominant reaction to black subordination might be more accurately characterized as apathy

269. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 4. But see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO
HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION & CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 205 (2010) (contending that, in the

fight against Jim Crow, the "law took the lead, defending the equal rights of African-Americans
long before Americans had come to a consensus about racial matters").
270. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 41.
271. See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REv.

859, 904 n.194 (2009) ("The definitive account of the background and aftermath of Brown ... is
Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights . . . ."). Strauss also suggests that when the Court decided

Brown "[a] national consensus against segregation had been building for a generation." Id. at 904.
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rather than as enmity.272 Indeed, consensus constitutionalism generally
obscures the wide range of racial opinion among northern whites when
Brown was decided. On this score, Heman Sweatt, who would become the
first black student to attend the University of Texas School of Law, noted the
conflicting opinions regarding race that existed among people outside of the
South. "[A]s far as attitudes regarding the problem of segregated education
are involved, unanimity of opinion does not exist anywhere," Sweatt
explained. 27 3 "Very assuredly, I did not find such a state at Michigan
University during my study there toward the master's degree."274
i. Polling.275 -Sweatt's assessment is supported by polling data
suggesting that even after Brown most whites did not experience a moral
awakening to racial injustice. The results of a January 1956 poll revealed
that, when asked whether most blacks in the United States were being treated
fairly or unfairly, 63 percent of respondents indicated that the treatment of
blacks was fair, and just 32 percent stated that blacks were treated unfairly. 27 6
A poll published in Scientific American in December 1956, which also asked
whether most blacks were being treated fairly, revealed no sharp regional
disagreement. 277 Where the December 1956 poll found that 69 percent of the
white public contended that most blacks were being treated fairly, 65 percent
272. Klarman's book does not wholly ignore the lack of resolve associated with white
northerners' support for Brown. When Klarman mentions this matter, however, the brief discussion
risks overstating that support. Klarman writes: "Brown increased the salience of the segregation
issue, and in 1954 many Americans, if forced to take a position, could only be integrationists. Yet,
endorsing a position and being strongly committed to it are very different things." KLARMAN,
supra note 10, at 366. As the ensuing discussion will make clear, it seems doubtful that many white
northerners in the mid-1950s truly earned the appellation "integrationist." By "being strongly
committed" to Brown, moreover, Klarman means that individuals supported "the use of federal
troops to enforce it, or cutting off federal education funds to districts that defied it, or breaking a
southern filibuster in the Senate over legislation to implement it." Id. at 365. Establishing such an
extraordinarily high threshold for evincing a "strong[] commit[ment]" to Brown, and then noting
that northern whites fell short of it, obscures precisely how anemic white northemers' integrationist
commitments were during the 1950s-even as a concept in the abstract. It is regrettable that
Klarman does not dedicate more time to exploring the shallowness of white northerners' proBrown sentiment, as that phenomenon undermines the notion that the Court in Brown articulated a
consensus or an emerging consensus.
273. Heman Marion Sweatt, Why I Want to Attend the University of Texas, TEXAS RANGER,

Sept. 1947, at 20, 40.
274. Id.
275. 1 harbor serious reservations about the ability of polling data to capture the full complexity
of Americans' views of constitutional questions. One of the principal weaknesses of much polling
data is its failure to even attempt to capture the intensity that individuals attach to their responses.
In addition, polling data often probes respondents' policy preferences rather than their constitutional
views. See infra note 409 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, given that polling data composes
such an important device in the consensus constitutionalists' tool kit, it seems appropriate to
dedicate some time to exploring how-even using a preferred methodology of consensus
constitutionalists-contested constitutionalism more accurately captures the dynamic on the ground.
276. Hazel Gaudet Erskine, The Polls: Race Relations, 26 PUB. OPINION

Q. 137,

139 (1962).

277. Herbert H. Hyman & Paul B. Sheatsley, Attitudes Toward Desegregation, SC. AM., Dec.
1956, at 35, 39.
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of white northerners agreed with the sentiment (in comparison to 79 percent
of white southerners).278 The willingness of northern whites to accept the
treatment of blacks as second-class citizens proved surprisingly stable, even
after the inception of the direct-action phase of the civil rights movement.
Indeed, a study conducted in 1963 among only northern whites found that 51
percent thought American blacks were treated about right, 38 percent thought
they were treated insufficiently well, and an astounding 11 percent thought
that blacks were treated excessively well.279 When Gallup asked the openended question of whether any group was being treated unfairly in the United
States in 1963, an overwhelming 80 percent said no. 2 80 Although 5 percent
indicated blacks were being treated unfairly, 4 percent indicated that whites
were unfairly treated.28 1
The decidedly limited commitment to racial equality on the part of
white northerners after Brown can perhaps best be glimpsed by comparing
their attitudes with white southerners in subsequent years. In September
1956, when asked whether black students and white students should attend
the same schools, 60 percent of white northerners indicated that they should
attend the same schools. 2 82 By comparison, in mid-1965, 55 percent of white
southerners responded that students should attend integrated schools. 28 3 Few
people today, of course, would contend that the white South had resolved its
profound racial problems as early as mid-1965, a time that precedes even the
Voting Rights Act's passage. 284 Yet given the similarity in poll responses, it
is extremely difficult to reconcile the vision of racially enlightened northern
whites during the mid-1950s with the suggestion of racially backward southern whites during the mid-1960s.2 85
Polling data has also captured the way in which support for
affirmatively achieving racial integration among many white northerners was
connected to the understanding that they were commenting on a distinctly
southern phenomenon. As the authors of a comprehensive volume analyzing
changes in racial attitudes over time have noted, "Support for federal desegregation efforts was high in the early 1960s, especially among more educated
Northern whites, because attention was focused on ending de jure

278. Id. at 39.
279. Stewart Alsop & Oliver Quayle, What Northerners Really Think of Negroes, SATURDAY

EVENING POST, Sept. 7, 1963, at 17, 20.
280. ROSENBERG, supra note 124, at 129.

281. Id
282. See Paul B. Sheatsley, White Attitudes Toward the Negro, 95 DAEDALUS 217, 219 chart 1

(1966).
283. Id. at 235.

284. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006) (codified on August 6, 1965).
285. This point may also serve as a cautionary tale regarding polling data's limitations.
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segregation in the South."286 During the early 1960s, the media had largely
framed the issue of federal involvement as a necessary tool to control
obstreperous southern whites who were dedicated to defying the Supreme
Court.287 When the efforts to integrate schools expanded beyond the South,
however, many northerners rapidly retreated from their expansive support for
racial desegregation: "Northern support began to erode at the beginning of
the 1970s, when attention shifted to altering de facto segregation in the
North, especially but not only through court-ordered busing."288 During this
period, the northern commitment to extolling the principle of integration in
the abstract increased, even as the northern commitment to seeing integration
in practice plummeted. 2 89 The chasm between rhetoric and reality is, of
course, a sadly familiar tradition in American history.
It is also important to understand that a failure to register objection to
school integration should not be mistaken for a desire among northern white
adults to have their children attend integrated schools. In 1963-a full nine
years after Brown and just one year before the passage of the celebrated 1964
Civil Rights Act-a study asked northern white adults the following:
"Suppose you yourself had school-age children, other things being equal,
would you prefer that they went to [an] integrated school, all white, or would
it make no difference to you?" 2 90 Although 41 percent responded that the
racial composition of the school would make no difference, 42 percent of
white northerners responded that they would prefer an "all white" school. 29 1
A mere 17 percent of white northerners expressed a preference for an
"integrated" school.292
ii. Social Histories.-Recent works by historians Thomas
Sugrue,2 9 3 Martha Biondi,2 94 and Jeff Wiltse 2 95 helpfully complicate the oversimplified idea that a racially enlightened North was utterly distinct from a

286. HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL.,
INTERPRETATIONS 127 (rev. ed. 1997).

RACIAL

ATTITUDES

IN

AMERICA:

TRENDS

AND

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 126 fig.3.8; see also id. at 192 ("[T]here is noticeably less support for the
implementation of principles than for principles as such."); Lawrence D. Bobo, The Color Line, the
Dilemma, and the Dream, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WRONGS: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS

SINCE WORLD WAR II 31, 31-55 (John Higham ed., 1997) (describing the persistent disparity

between the embrace of racial integration in principle and the failure to implement true integration
in practice).
290. Alsop & Quayle, supra note 279, at 20.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE NORTH (2008).
294. MARTHA BIONDI, To STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR
NEW YORK CITY (2003).
295. JEFF WILTSE, CONTESTED WATERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SWIMMING POOLS IN
AMERICA (2007).
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racially unenlightened South. Sugrue's sardonically titled Sweet Land of
Liberty shifts the traditional frame of the civil rights movement from the
South to the North, emphasizing that cities like Chicago, Detroit, and
Newark witnessed struggles for racial equality that have been misleadingly
296
omitted from the conventional civil rights narrative.
Although many people know that movement martyrs James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and
Andrew Goodman were abducted from Philadelphia, Mississippi, 2 97 Sugrue
insists that too few students of civil rights history understand the midtwentieth century events that prompted many blacks to refer derisively to
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, as "Up South." 2 9 8 As this nickname may implicitly suggest (given its identification of the South as the touchstone for black
subordination), black citizens did in fact enjoy less constrained racial lives in
the North than they did in the South. 2 99 Nevertheless, as Sugrue repeatedly
underscores, allowing that the South was, in some meaningful sense, racially
"worse" than the North hardly suggests that northern race relations were unblemished by racism. 300 "Less bad," in other words, does not mean "good."
Sugrue also details the way in which Brown sparked racial reactions
among white northerners. Sugrue notes that, contrary to popular belief, some
towns in northern states (including York, Carlisle, and Steelton,
Pennsylvania) continued to operate officially segregated schools for a brief
period even after the Court issued Brown in 1954.301 Apart from official
segregation, moreover, Sugrue reconstructs the way in which many white
northerners rationalized the all-white schools their children attended as
somehow meaningfully distinct from the all-white schools that existed in the
South: 'There is, of course, no official segregation in the city,' noted a New
York Times columnist in 1957. 'It is illegal.' Using the passive voice, thus
making the process of segregation seem the inevitable consequence of impersonal forces beyond control, he argued that segregation 'is caused by the
residential pattern."' 302 Where the South engaged in Massive Resistance,303
the North, thus, engaged in a phenomenon that might be dubbed "Passive

296. See SUGRUE, supra note 293, at xiv, 325 (opining that the exclusion of the North from
accounts of the civil rights struggle, or its "selective inclusion" as a foil to the South, ignores the
history of racial conflict in the North, as illustrated by violent, and sometimes deadly, "clashes
between young black men and the police" in the cities of Chicago, Detroit, and Newark).
297. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974 553
(1996).
298. SUGRUE, supra note 293, at xiv, xxi.

299. Id. at 256.
300. See id. at 257 ("Despite improvements in the aggregate, the economic reality for most
northern blacks was starkly unequal.").
301. Id. at 183.
302. Id
303. See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (Louisiana paperback ed. 1999) (1969).
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Resistance."304 Southerners actively segregated their schools, according to
the Passive Resistance mindset, but in the North, well, schools were not so
much segregated as they were non-integrated in light of racially distinct
neighborhoods-a phenomenon that arose by sheer happenstance. "Whites
could deny responsibility for racial segregation, for their choices about where
to live and where to send their children to school were individualized and
ostensibly race-neutral," Sugrue writes. 30 5 "The logical conclusion of this
line of reasoning was that it was the natural order of things that the vast majority of whites lived in all-white communities and that blacks were confined
This
to segregated neighborhoods and mostly minority schools."3 0 6
rationalization, as Sugrue notes, was designed to remove any notion of
wrongdoing from the North's racial equation: "Like lived with like, birds of a
feather flocked together. No one was at fault." 30 7
Where Sugrue offers a panoramic vision of the civil rights struggle
throughout the urban North after World War II, Biondi's To Stand and Fight
provides an in-depth examination of that struggle in one particular locale:
New York City. Biondi notes that, although racially segregated public
schools were deemed unconstitutional throughout New York State in 1938,
education officials facilitated racial segregation long after that theoretical
expiration date. 308 Among other techniques designed to maintain racially
defined schools, New York City Board of Education officials redrew school
attendance lines, located new schools in strategic sites, and bused white students in order to avoid them attending nearby black schools. 30 9 Biondi
recalls how Kenneth Clark, a City College professor who provided expert
testimony that the Court relied upon in Brown, delivered a speech at an
Urban League dinner shortly after the Court issued its decision where he
stated that segregated schools existed in New York just as surely as they existed in the Deep South.3 10 Biondi explains, "Civil rights activists like Clark
knew that comparisons between northern and southern racism tended to
unnerve northern white leaders." 311 Clark's speech proved no exception.

304. I use this term in a somewhat different fashion than Professor Cho has used it. See Sumi
Cho, From Massive Resistance, to PassiveResistance, to Righteous Resistance: Understandingthe

Culture Wars from Brown to Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 824 (2005) (using the term
"passive resistance" to describe the efforts of "affirmative action advocates . . . [who] mounted a
quiet, behind-the-scenes resistance to the parts of the [Bakke] decision they did not like").
305. SUGRUE, supra note 293, at 184.

306.
307.
308.
309.

Id.
Id.
BIONDI, supra note 294, at 241.
Id. at 241-42.

310. Id. at 246; cf Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to RacialLiteracy: Brown v. Board of

Education and the Interest-DivergenceDilemma, 91 J.AM. HIST. 92, 110-11 (2004) (noting that the
Kenneth Clark doll experiments relied upon in Brown revealed in fact that black students in the
North need not be racially segregated in order to internalize feelings of racial inferiority).
311. BIONDI, supra note 294, at 246.
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Hewing to the northern white establishment's party line, the Board of
Education President, who attended the Urban League dinner, rejected all
responsibility for school segregation, and the school superintendent
subsequently called segregation in Harlem "accidental" and even
"natural." 3 12 Biondi concludes by suggesting that, even assuming that "de
facto segregation" constitutes a sensible term, it has questionable
applicability to New York City because governmental entities consistently
engendered segregation in the education, employment, and residential
realms.
The complex attitudes among northern whites toward black equality can
also be more fully ascertained by examining leisure activities during the
Brown era. Although many barrels of ink have been spilled about the quest
for racial integration in the educational context, 314 social historians have only
recently begun to flesh out how racial interactions unfolded (and, more to the
point, did not unfold) in other, nonschool arenas. Jeff Wiltse's historical exploration of the community swimming pool as a locus for disputes about
public space highlights the notion that many northern whites, halfhearted
approval of Brown notwithstanding, steadfastly avoided interactions with
blacks.
Wiltse notes that racial lines began to harden at swimming pools
in the North beginning in the 1920s, as the Great Migration witnessed significant numbers of blacks living outside of the South for the first time.316
Although racial rhetoric among white northerners became more liberal
following World War II, Wiltse observes, the "integration" of public
swimming pools in the North during the 1940s and 1950s typically meant
that municipal pools went from all white to all black.317 White swimmers, in
turn, generally fled to the all-white oases provided by private pools or ceased
swimming altogether.3 18
312. Id. at 246-47.
313. Id.at 285.
314. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004); SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF
INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004);
LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE
SCHOOLS (1976); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); JAMES T. PATTERSON,
BROWN V.BOARD OFEDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001);
JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, Two SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (2010).

315. WILTSE, supra note 295, at 157 (discussing how "[d]esegregation did not really integrate
[Baltimore's) municipal pools").
316. Id. at 3-4.
317. Id. at 159 ("In large cities, desegregation transferred use of some pools from white
swimmers to black but rarely led to meaningful interracial swimming.").
318. Id at 205 ("Between 1950 and 1970, millions of Americans chose to stop swimming at
municipal pools. This represented a mass abandonment of public space and was caused most
directly by racial desegregation."); id. at 159 ("When one-pool communities kept their desegregated
pools open, many whites retreated to private pools or simply stopped swimming.").
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The racial dynamic of swimming pools in the North sheds considerable
light upon the extraordinarily shallow commitment to black equality that
many northern whites held at the time of Brown. At least as a theoretical
matter, one could imagine swimming pools being considerably easier to integrate than public schools. It seems distinctly possible, for instance, that
parents would be a good deal less emotionally invested in where their children swam compared to where their children learned.1
Moreover,
achieving integrated municipal swimming pools should have been comparatively less weighed down by residential segregation and bureaucracy (i.e.,
pupil assignment). Despite the comparatively lower barriers to racial integration in the context of swimming, however, neither public pools nor public
schools witnessed much in the way of meaningful and sustained cross-racial
interactions. In both venues, then, it seems that a commitment to integration
among white northerners in the hypothetical vanished in the actual.
iii. A New Map.-Consensus constitutionalists often note that
seventeen states enforced racially segregated educational facilities and that
an additional four states permitted, but did not require, localities to adopt
racial segregation. 32 0 These twenty-one racially retrograde states, it is
understood, are trumped by the remaining twenty-seven states, which had not
enacted state laws either requiring or permitting Jim Crow. 32 1 Thus, in its
crudest articulation, the consensus constitutionalist account of Brown might
be reduced to a mathematical formula: 27 > 21 = school desegregation.
Although this view contains undeniable appeal at first blush, that era's
racial realities contained greater complexity than is captured by the vulgar
tallying of state racial policies. Consensus constitutionalism generally disregards the racial compositions of the various states that existed in 1950s
America. As a result, it attributes a sense of racial injustice about black
inequality to many northern whites who, to the extent they thought about race
at all, likely viewed America's racial situation more as an abstraction than a
reality. The twenty-seven states that consensus constitutionalists cite as embodying the nation's supposed racially egalitarian values at the time of
Brown had-on the whole-dramatically lower percentages of black residents than the states that had legally segregated schools. Nineteen of the
twenty-seven non-Jim Crow states, more than two-thirds, had fewer than 2.8

319. But fears of miscegenation, of course, pervaded both contexts. See WILTSE, supra note
295, passim; PATTERSON, supra note 314, at 6 ("For many whites, the very idea of desegregated
schools prompted the ugliest imaginable images of racial mixing.").
320. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 311 (pointing out that "Brown was not inevitable in
1954, when seventeen states and the District of Columbia still segregated their schools and four
more states permitted local communities to adopt segregation at their discretion").
321. Alaska and Hawaii, it must be remembered, did not gain admission to the United States
until 1959. Hawaii Admission Act, Pub. L. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959); Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L.
85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958).
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percent black residents, according to the 1950 census.322 Twelve of those
nineteen states, moreover, had fewer than 1 percent black residents.32 3 And
six of those twelve states had fewer than 0.2 percent black residents.324
Conversely, every state featuring what could be considered a substantial
black percentage of the population required schoolchildren to be segregated
by law. Thirteen states, in other words, had black populations greater than
10 percent in 1950,325 and all thirteen of those states featured Jim Crow
schools.32 6 This more textured understanding of state reaction to Brown
complicates the racially egalitarian views that consensus constitutionalism
implicitly attributes to residents of states that had an infinitesimal percentage
of black residents.
What, precisely, would it mean for a white person to express racially
egalitarian views regarding school placement living in 1950s Idaho, Iowa,
Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, or Wisconsin? Those states all had black populations of fewer than 1 percent. 32 7 Anti-black sentiment appears to have been
most widespread where blacks composed a large percentage of the
population.328 The notion that white attitudes about school integration were
driven in large part by the surrounding racial realities finds at least some
support in polling data. In 1959, five years after Brown, Gallup asked white
parents in the North whether they would object to, inter alia, having their
children attend "a school where a few of the children are colored," and
whether they would object if it were a school "where more than half of the
children are colored." 32 9 Predictably, an overwhelming 92 percent of white
northern parents expressed no objection to sending their children to school
with a small number of black students, and just 7 percent objected.3 o In answering the question about the school where black students outnumbered
white students, however, 58 percent of white northern parents expressed
objection, and just 35 percent expressed no objection. 33 1 These responses

322. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, POPULATION, BY RACE, STATES: 1930-1950, at 30 tbl.27 (1960) [hereinafter
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT BY RACE].

323. Id.

324. Id.
325. See id.

326. See id.
327. Id.

328. See V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5 (1949) (contending that

white antipathy toward blacks was strongest in areas with a large percentage of black residents).
329. Mixed Schools: How Northern Parents Feel, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Mar. 23,

1959, at 12.
330. Id.
331. Id In response to a question of whether they would object to sending their child to a
school "where one half of the children are colored," 34 percent of northern white parents objected,
and 63 percent registered no objection. Id.
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help to reveal the profound limitations of even an abstract commitment to
racial egalitarianism among northern whites.
Had there been larger concentrations of blacks spread throughout the
country during the Brown era, it is certainly possible that the Court's decision
would have been greeted with even less enthusiasm. Shortly after the Court
issued Brown, a white southemer who supported racial integration
memorably pressed precisely this point in an interview with Robert Penn
Warren. "It's not a question of being Southern," he explained. 33 2 "You put
the same number of Yankee liberals in [a predominantly black] county and in
a week they'd be behaving the same way [as Southern racists]. Living with
something and talking about it are two very different things, and living with
something is always the slow way."333
b. White Southerners.-In today's popular imagination, white
southemers during the age of the civil rights movement are widely
understood to have been virtually uniform in their intense opposition to racial
equality in general and to Brown in particular. 33 4 Professor Klarman's
work-most significantly, the backlash thesiS33 5-should be commended for
helping to complicate this misleading narrative. By emphasizing that Brown
eliminated the political space available to southern racial moderates and,
thus, incentivized politicians in the South to adopt unyielding prosegregation poses, Klarman acknowledges that not all white southerners held
identical racial attitudes.336 In a similar vein, Klarman often admirably
recognizes that the various states in the South had varying racial climates,
instead of treating the region as an undifferentiated mass.337
For all its considerable strengths, though, two matters blemish
Klarman's depiction of racial attitudes among white southemers. First,
Klarman principally focuses his attention on the views of white southern
politicians rather than on the views of ordinary white southerners.338 There

332. ROBERT PENN WARREN, SEGREGATION: THE INNER CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH 26-27

(1956).
333. Id. at 27.

334. This notion enjoys a lengthy history. Melvin M. Tumin, Readiness and Resistance to
Desegregation: A Social Portraitof the Hard Core, 36 SOC. FORCES 256, 256 (1958) ("It is a

popular notion that the South is a homogenous unit so far as its attitudes toward desegregation are
concerned.").
335. See supranote 226.
336. See id

337. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 348 ("The eleven states of the former Confederacy
responded to Brown very differently from the border states."); id at 400 ("Florida, Texas, and
Tennessee, states that had never fully embraced massive resistance, further distanced themselves
from it in 1958-1959.").
338. This shortcoming is most pronounced in Klarman's two articles from 1994 laying out the
backlash thesis.

See supra note 226. Though the treatment in From Jim Crow to Civil Rights

makes strides along this dimension, it, too, concentrates too heavily upon the actions of politicians.
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is, of course, some relationship (almost certainly a strong one) between those
two sets of views. But by concentrating his attention inordinately upon the
racial radicalization of white southern politicians, Klarman accords pride of
place to the massive resistance coalition and, consequently, underplays those
who dissented. Second, even when he looks beyond politicians and characterizes the racial attitudes of white southerners themselves, Klarman would
do well to avoid phrasing that diminishes the avowed willingness of some
white southerners to follow Brown. In noting that one of the features that
made the Court's progressive race-based decisions difficult to implement was
that many people who rejected the decisions were geographically
concentrated, Klarman writes, "Virtually all white southerners disagreed with
Brown, and opponents of other race decisions ... were likewise concentrated
in the South."339 Similarly, when Klarman assesses the causes of white
southern opposition to Brown, he writes: "Perhaps most important, the desire
of nearly all whites to preserve segregation if possible virtually ensured an
attempt at massive resistance."34 0
Although it is certainly true that white southerners during the 1950s and
1960s expressed more widespread hostility to Brown than their northern
counterparts, accounts of this era should more consistently highlight the
multiplicity of southern white racial attitudes. It is important to note that a
nontrivial number of white southerners during the Brown era evinced-at
least as measured by the standards of the time-relatively egalitarian racial
thoughts. In the mid-1950s, for instance, Lewis Killian and John Haer conducted a sociological examination of the attitudes of white adults in
Tallahassee, Florida, toward school desegregation.341 Although Killian and
Haer conceded that "[i]t would be extremely unrealistic to contend that ...
any large portion of the southern white population has been in favor of public
school desegregation," they also steadfastly insisted, "[i]t would be equally
unrealistic to assert that those spokesmen who declare, 'The South will never
stand for desegregation,' accurately reflect the sentiments of the great majority of white southerners, even though the voices raised to contradict them
seem weak and few." 342
Killian and Haer proceeded to enumerate a taxonomy of four general
approaches to Brown among white southerners: (1) accepters, who agreed
See KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 385 ("My claim is that Brown radicalized southern politics, as
voters elected candidates who espoused extreme segregationist positions.").
339. KLARMAN,supra note 10, at 461.
340. Id at 409. Klarman's book seems to reveal some internal tension regarding even the
approximate percentages of white southerners who wished to follow Brown. Two sentences after
declaring that "the desire of nearly all whites [was] to preserve segregation," he allows that "many
white southerners were prepared to comply with Brown, and a few actually agreed with it . . . ." Id.
Reconciling those two assertions is not easy.
341. Lewis M. Killian & John L. Haer, Variables Related to Attitudes Regarding School
Desegregation Among White Southerners, 21 SOCIOMETRY 159, 159-64 (1958).

342. Id
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with Brown and thought that the decision should be followed; (2) compliers,
who disagreed with Brown, but thought that it should nevertheless be
followed; (3) delayers, who disagreed with Brown and thought that all legal
means should be attempted to evade the decision; and (4) resisters, who
disagreed with Brown and thought that the decision should never be
enforced, even if such an approach clashed with the law.343 The poll yielded
13 percent accepters, 12 percent compliers, 57 percent delayers, and 17 percent resisters.344 The most striking differences in background characteristics
among the four groups could, predictably, be found between accepters and
resisters. "College graduates are over-represented among [a]ccepters, while
people with less than 12 years of schooling (high school) are overrepresented among [r]esisters," Killian and Haer wrote. 34 5 "These types
differ significantly in occupation and in age, with [a]ccepters tending to be
professional or managerial persons, concentrated in the age group 20-29, and
[r]esisters tending to be manual and service workers, concentrated in the age
bracket above 50 years." 346
A nationwide poll conducted in 1956 supports the idea that a range of
reaction among white southerners to the notion of school desegregation could
be detected well beyond the Florida panhandle.3 47 Southern supporters of
school desegregation possessed, moreover, similar demographic
characteristics to the Tallahassee accepters.348 Although the 1956 poll
indicated that only 14 percent of white southerners approved of school
desegregation, education and youth were positively correlated with an
increased willingness to approve of the decision. 34 9 College-educated white
southerners, 28 percent of whom thought that whites and blacks should
attend the same schools, were twice as likely to accept school desegregation
as compared to the general population of southern whites. 350 Although the
effect of youth on views regarding desegregation was not as pronounced as
the effect of education, 19 percent of white southerners between twenty-one
and twenty-four years old approved of school desegregation.35 1
Social historians have recently begun to confound the overly uniform
depiction of southern white racial attitudes during the post-World War II era.
Jason Sokol's There Goes My Everything captures the deep ambivalence and

343. Id at 160.
344. Id. at 161.

345. Id
346. Id.
347. Hyman & Sheatsley, supranote 277, at 36.
348. Id. at 36, 38.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 36. Just 5 percent of white southerners who attained only a grammar-school
education supported interracial education, according to the poll. Id.
351. Id. at 38. Just 10 percent of white southerners older than sixty-four approved of Brown.
Id.
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sense of bewilderment that beset many southern whites during the civil rights
movement. "Most white southerners identified neither with the civil rights
movement nor with its violent resisters," Sokol explains. "They were fearful,
silent, and often inert." 3 52 Sokol highlights how ordinary southern whites
were-as a result of Brown, the civil rights movement, and the
accompanying racial upheaval-forced to contemplate the subordination of
blacks, a phenomenon that had not previously demanded much sustained
thought.s 3 Sokol understands, of course, that the overwhelming majority of
white southerners opposed racially integrated education during the postBrown era, and that some expressed that opposition with considerable
intensity. 354 Nevertheless, Sokol insists that we remember that at least some
white southerners immediately accepted Brown's legitimacy, and that many
more harbored deeply conflicting feelings about the decision.3 55 Simply because every member of the mob who gathered to oppose the desegregation of
Little Rock Central High School in 1957 was white does not mean that all
white people were hardliners on the question of racial integration. Legal
history would do well to consistently highlight the wide array of southern
white attitudes regarding race.
c. African-Americans.-A contested-constitutionalist approach to
understanding the rich set of reactions to Brown also requires emphasizing
that black people did not, contrary to popular perception, universally embrace the decision calling for school desegregation. 356 A poll conducted by
the American Institute of Public Opinion in February 1956, for instance, revealed that a mere 53 percent of black southerners approved of Brown.357

352. JASON SOKOL, THERE GOES MY EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF

CIVIL RIGHTS, 1945-1975, at 4 (2006).
353. Id; see also Walter Dellinger, A Southern White Recalls a Moral Revolution, WASH.

POST, May 15, 1994, at Cl ("Segregation was a fact about my universe; it seemed no more 'right'
or 'wrong' than the placement of the planets in the solar system. It simply was.").
354. SOKOL, supra note 352, at 149 (describing white riots and hangings in effigy in response
to judicially enforced integration of the University of Georgia as late as 196 1).
355. Id. at i15.
356. Though Klarman's book cites a Gallup poll conducted in 1955 that revealed modest levels
of black support for Brown, see KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 352, the book dedicates surprisingly
little attention to misgivings among blacks regarding the wisdom of pursuing school desegregation.
357. Erskine, supra note 276, at 140. More than one-third (36 percent) of black southerners
disapproved of the decision, and II percent expressed no opinion. Id.
Notably, another AIPO poll conducted in November 1957-approximately twenty-one months
later-found that a higher percentage of black southerners (69 percent) registered approval of
Brown and a much lower percentage of black southerners (13 percent) expressed disapproval. Id.
The percentage of black southerners expressing no opinion of the decision increased to 18 percent.
Id. Do these strikingly different results mean that the February 1956 poll somehow failed to gauge
the accurate level of pro-Brown sentiment among blacks in the South? It seems improbable.
Rather, the volatile poll results likely stem from the cataclysmic events that surrounded the
integration of Little Rock Central High School in September 1957. Those events, which dominated
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Although it is tempting to think that many black respondents may have
publicly dissembled to poll takers when they were in fact privately exultant,
that thought is compromised by the fact that black respondents expressed a
good deal more enthusiasm for other racially egalitarian policies. Indeed,
another poll also taken in 1956 revealed that more than 80 percent of southern blacks approved of an Interstate Commerce Commission decision
invalidating Jim Crow transportation laws.
The precise reasons leading black southerners to disapprove of Brown
are surely complex. Despite that complexity, however, it remains well worth
contemplating at some length what may have motivated so many black
southerners-the very people who were believed to be the most immediate
beneficiaries of Brown-to express disapproval of that decision. Historian
James T. Patterson has noted the decidedly mixed reaction to Brown among
blacks and offered potential reasons why some blacks may have expressed
wariness. "Some of those who said that they disapproved of Brown had no
great wish to have their children mix with white people," Patterson wrote.
"Others suspected that desegregation would force them to assimilate into
white culture. Still others, proud of their schools, worried about the impact
of the decision on black educators."" 9 More recently, Stuart Buck has noted
that the all-black school-whatever its considerable shortcomings-"was the
most important institution in the black community, next to the church." 3 60
Some black citizens during the mid-1950s doubtlessly understood that the
destruction of Jim Crow also augured the destruction of that institution.36 1
An additional reason for blacks' circumspection regarding Brown may have
stemmed from anticipating that merely because blacks and whites wouldeventually-attend the same schools did not necessarily mean that they
362
In 1955, Zora Neale Hurston articulated
would attend the same classes.
the southern black resistance to Brown that stemmed from racial pride. "The
whole matter revolves around the self-respect of my people," Hurston wrote.

the national news, had the effect of making Brown tangible and may have (in the minds of more
black southerners) equated expressing disapproval of the decision with a belief in white supremacy.
358. Id. at 144. Professor Gerald Rosenberg has noted the discrepancies among black
southerners' attitudes toward desegregating schools and railcars. See ROSENBERG, supra note 124,
at 132.
359. PATTERSON, supra note 314, at xxvi.
360. STUART BUCK, ACTING WHITE: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF DESEGREGATION 58 (2010).

361. See id at 73 (quoting William Mansel Long of Tuscumbia, Alabama as saying: "The
Supreme Court decision of 1954 didn't give us school integration in Tuscumbia, it gave us school
elimination. It eliminated the black schools and forced the black children to go to the white
school.").
362. See id. at 116-24 (analyzing the racial dimensions of "tracking," i.e., sorting students by
perceived academic ability).

818

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 89:755

"How much satisfaction can I get from a court order for somebody to
associate with me who does not wish me near them?" 363
Prominent black citizens, both before and after Brown, repeatedly
warned of the dangers of prioritizing school integration in the quest for racial
equality. In 1935, nearly two decades before the Court decided Brown,
W.E.B. Du Bois contended that "the Negro needs neither segregated schools
nor mixed schools. What he needs is Education." 364 Du Bois further cautioned that "[a] mixed school with poor and unsympathetic teachers, with
hostile public opinion, and no teaching of truth concerning black folk, is
bad."365 Even Martin Luther King, Jr.-for many, the very embodiment of
the hope for an integrated society366-is reported to have privately expressed
much the same sentiment in a 1959 conversation with a teacher from an allblack high school in Montgomery, Alabama.367 "I favor integration on buses
and in all areas of public accommodation and travel. I am for equality.
However, I think integration in our public schools is different," said King,
who had studied in both segregated and integrated school environments.36 8
"In that setting, you are dealing with one of the most important assets of an
individual-the mind," King contended. "White people view black people
as inferior. A large percentage of them have a very low opinion of our race.
People with such a low view of the black race cannot be given free rein and
put in charge of the intellectual care and development of our boys and
girls."369
As the dispute about implementing Brown turned from combating
segregation to achieving integration, black citizens retained deep divisions.
In 1976, Derrick Bell contended that the black community divided sharply
regarding the wisdom of civil rights attorneys' identifying racial integration,
rather than excellence in education, as the ultimate goal. 3 70 Bell suggested
that blacks were principally divided by economic class regarding the value of
integration, with some blacks favoring excellent schools (whatever their

363. Zora Neale Hurston, Court Order Can't Make Races Mix, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 11,
1955, reprintedin FOLKLORE, MEMOIRS, AND OTHER WRITING 956 (Cheryl A. Wall ed., 1995).
364. W.E.B. Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335
(1935).
365. Id.
366. See Martha Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 599, 601 (2008) (noting that King "offered the most stirring and ambitious vision of
integration for this nation, beyond anything that the nation achieved even at the height of judiciallymonitored school desegregation").
367. Samuel G. Freedman, Still Separate, Still Unequal, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, § 7, at 8
(book review).
368. Id. For an account of King's educational background, see DAVID L. LEWIS, KING: A
BIOGRAPHY (1978).
369. Freedman, supra note 367.
370. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
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racial composition), and more affluent blacks valorizing racial integration.37'
In a detailed exploration of the quest for integration in Atlanta, Georgia during the early 1970s, however, Tomiko Brown-Nagin usefully interrogated
Bell's narrative. 3 72 Brown-Nagin found that black Atlantans' divisions
regarding integration also occurred within economic classes: "Working-class
clients did not uniformly oppose racial-balance orders, and school integration
was not advocated and imposed by a unified group of middle-class decision
makers from outside of the city."3 73 To the contrary, Brown-Nagin contended that middle-class blacks in fact opposed school desegregation in order
"to protect black middle-class employment interests and to preserve a select
group of segregated, but highly regarded, schools that catered to the children
of Atlanta's African American elite."374 Whatever the precise explanation
for anti-Brown sentiment among black southerners, historical accounts
attendant to contested constitutional values should explore the varied
responses to the decision and its aftermath in their full complexity.
2. Against Inevitability.-The notion that the Court
"conver[ted]

...

an emerging national consensus

in Brown

into a constitutional

command" betrays a vivid instance of the backward-looking historical inevitability that mars much of consensus constitutionalism. 375 Indeed, despite the
analytical shortcomings of historical approaches predicated on inevitability,
Klarman has nevertheless characterized progress on the racial front as
"inevitable," contending that racial reform in America after 1945 would have
certainly occurred even had the judiciary abstained from resolving the race
question. 37 6 "[A] variety of deep-seated social, political, and economic
forces ... would have undermined Jim Crow regardless of Supreme Court

intervention," Klarman wrote.3 77 These forces, Klarman suggested, "were
propelling the nation ineluctably toward greater racial equality." 3 7 8 Although
he has softened some of his initial counterintuitive claims regarding Brown
since they appeared in print,379 Klarman continues to hold fast to the

371. See id. at 489-92.

372. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 262, at 1925 ("[T]he historical record supports a correlation
between remedial preferences and class that is significantly different from, and indeed in some ways
the opposite of, that supposed by Bell.").
373. Id. at 1925-26.
374. Id. at 1926.
375. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 310.
376. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, supra note 226, at 10

("[R]acial change in America was inevitable owing to a variety of deep-seated social, political, and
economic forces.").
377. Id.
378. Klarman, supra note 1, at 20.
379. See David J. Garrow, "Happy" Birthday, Brown v. Board of Education?: Brown's Fiftieth
Anniversary and the New Critics of Supreme Court Muscularity, 90 VA. L. REv. 693, 716 (2004)
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inevitability thesis. As he writes in the concluding paragraph of From Jim
Crow to Civil Rights, "[W]hile Brown did play a role in shaping both the
civil rights movement and the violent response it received from southern
whites, deep background forces ensured that the United States would experience a racial reform movement regardless of what the Supreme Court did or
did not do."380
Contested constitutionalism, unlike its consensus-based counterpart,
generally attempts to steer clear of deeming historical developments
"inevitable" or "ineluctable." Such terminology fails to convey the way in
which events involving human beings often defy prediction. Instead of
inevitability, constitutional history grounded in contest and conflict
emphasizes the contingency of historical developments. The emphasis on
contingency has the virtue of not only making for richer historical understanding but also of more accurately recreating the world that judges
contemplate when they decide cases. As discussed above, judges cannot
know with certainty whether something that seems to be a growing trend will
harden into a broadly held norm or whether a budding notion will prove to be
of merely passing fancy.
Given that consensus constitutionalists vigilantly criticize scholars who
deride Court decisions by viewing them with modern eyes,38 1 it is genuinely
confounding that they fall into the inevitability trap. When the subject matter
principally involves black citizens, moreover, historians should be
particularly reluctant to invoke ideas of "inevitability." After all, the story of
blacks within the United States is not one of steady progress, with each
decade's racial climate representing an improvement upon the preceding one.
Following World War II, as consensus constitutionalists note, the times certainly appeared ripe for a sustained period of strides toward racial equality.382
Yet the times also appeared ripe for such a sustained period immediately
following the Civil War.383 That moment, alas, proved ephemeral.3 84
Without the Court's invalidation of Jim Crow, of course, it is impossible
to know for certain whether demands for formal racial equality would have
been heeded. Rather than depicting judicial intervention as either irrelevant
or "almost perverse" in its effect on the nation's inevitable embrace of racial

(book review) (describing how Klarman's book, unlike an earlier article, allowed that Brown did in
fact meaningfully inspire blacks to challenge Jim Crow).
380. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 468.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
382. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 243 ("Racial attitudes in the nation were undergoing a
substantial transformation by the 1940s. Much of this had to do with the Second World War.");
KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 173-74 ("By the 1940s, long-term forces for racial change that had
antedated World War I-urbanization, industrialization, the Great Migration, and educational
advancement-were producing significant results. The war magnified these forces.").
383. See JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1988).
384. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 28-29 (2d rev. ed. 1966).
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egalitarianism,3ss it comes closer to the mark to acknowledge that the Court
provided advocates of racial equality with a powerful rhetorical and moral
weapon. 8 Without Court intervention, in other words, it would have been
impossible in 1955 for a twenty-six-year-old Martin Luther King, Jr. to claim
as the freshly anointed head of the Montgomery Improvement Association,
"If we are wrong, then the Supreme Court of this Nation is wrong. If we are
wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong. If we are wrong, God
Almighty is wrong." 387 Without Court intervention, it would have been
impossible in 1963 for President John F. Kennedy to claim that, with respect
to civil rights, "[w]e are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old
as the Scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution." 388 It seems
dubious, then, that in the sphere of racial inequality the Court's intervention
did not meaningfully alter and shape the historical developments that
followed in its wake. 3 89
B. CountermajoritarianCapabilities,Past and Future
1. InterracialMarriage.-In exploring the Court's involvement with
race cases during the period immediately following Brown, consensus constitutionalists often note that the Court encountered an (unwanted)
opportunity to eliminate prohibitions on interracial marriage in 1955. In
Naim v. Naim, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a state statute forbidding
white citizens from marrying a person of another race. 39 0 The Court sought
to rid itself of Naim (which came to the court as an appeal rather than as a
petition for certiorari) as quietly as possible. The Justices dodged Naim not
because they thought that Jim Crow marriage laws were legally or logically

385. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights Movement, supra note 226, at 76.

386. Klarman has not advocated a consistent line on whether Brown made a direct, positive
difference in the fight for racial equality. Initially, he cast grave doubt regarding Brown's
inspirational importance for the civil rights movement. See id. at 84. Toward the end of From Jim
Crow to Civil Rights, however, Klarman reversed course and allowed that the decision "plainly
inspired blacks," as it "furthered the hope and the conviction that fundamental racial change was
possible." KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 463. Professor Garrow took early notice of Klarman's
evolution on this point. See Garrow, supra note 379, at 716.
387. Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech at Holt Street Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama
(Dec. 5, 1955), reprinted in EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS-A READER

AND GUIDE 44, 45 (C. Carson et al. eds., 1987). For an examination of King's significance for
constitutional thought more broadly, see Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A
Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989).
388. Robert E. Gilbert, John F. Kennedy and Civil Rights for Black Americans, 12
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 386, 396 (1982).

389. For analysis of Brown's tangible impact on the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, see
Garrow, supra note 379, at 717.
390. 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955).
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distinct from Jim Crow education laws.391 Instead, the Court feared that
invalidating anti-miscegenation laws so closely on the heels of Brown would
compromise the validity of the school desegregation decisions because
opposition to interracial marriage was so widespread.3 92 As Klarman has
noted, "[O]pinion polls in the 1950s revealed that over 90 percent of whites,
even outside the South, opposed interracial marriage."3 93
Consensus constitutionalism suggests that the Court wisely decided to
bide its time in resolving the anti-miscegenation issue rather than rushing
headlong into a fight that it could not win. Legal scholars have debated for
decades whether the Court's evasion of Naim can be justified on prudential
grounds, even if it cannot be so justified on strictly jurisprudential grounds.
Where Alexander Bickel defended judicial evasiveness (at least in certain
circumstances), Gerald Gunther famously skewered Bickel for encouraging
the Court to be one hundred percent principled, but only twenty percent of
the time. 394 Although the contours of the Bickel-Gunther debate are familiar,
what has remained severely underexplored is the often unstated assumption
underlying consensus constitutionalism's support for the nondecision in
Naim: the Court waited to strike down prohibitions on interracial marriage
until national sentiment demanded such a decision. This assumption, as it
turns out, demands revisiting.
Sunstein details the Bickel-Gunther dispute at length and makes clear
that he believes that Bickel gets the better of the argument.39 5 Sunstein also
contends that the Court's strong suspicion that an anti-miscegenation decision would generate outrage "helps to explain the view that the Court was
right not to invalidate the ban on racial intermarriage in the 1950s" when it
evaded the issue in Naim.3 96 Friedman's book comes closest to articulating
what generally remains implied among consensus constitutionalists.39 7 In his

391.
practical
392.
393.

See KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 321-22 (identifying the Court's central concern as the
problem of addressing the heated issue of anti-miscegenation laws so soon after Brown).
Id
Id at 321.

394. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues "-A Comment on Principleand
Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).

395. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 127-39 (concluding that, while Bickel's theory neglects
some important considerations, Gunther's view is oversimplified).
396. Id. at 164.
397. Consensus constitutionalism often simply omits addressing Loving altogether. It is
somewhat perplexing that Klarman's book, which begins chronicling Court decisions involving race
toward the end of the nineteenth century, stops just shy of addressing the Court's decision in
Loving, widely deemed one of the most significant decisions involving racial equality during the
twentieth century. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1447, 1447
(2004) ("Loving marked the crystallization ... of the antisubordination principle . . . ."). When

Klarman has mentioned Loving in law review writings, he has tended to do so only in passing-and
in a way that is consistent with the consensus constitutionalist framework. See Michael J. Klarman,
Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REv. 431, 485-86 (2005) ("At some point,
the Court is likely to constitutionalize a newly emerging consensus and invalidate bans on same-sex
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discussion of race during the 1960s, Friedman writes, "Finally, the Court
mustered the wherewithal to face the one racial issue it had feared to confront
Recounting the history of Naim, Friedman
amid all the controversy . . . .
notes, "Mixed marriage was a sensitive issue throughout the country . . . . It

was only in 1967, some thirteen years after Brown and well after passage of
the Civil Rights Act, that the Court finally struck down such laws as
unconstitutional, in the aptly named case Loving v. Virginia."399 Friedman's
narrative, consistent with the conventional understanding within legal circles
more broadly,4 00 suggests that by the time the Court decided Loving the
"controvers[ial]" and "sensitive" feelings regarding interracial marriage had
dwindled.4 0' National values embraced racial egalitarianism in the mid1960s (as demonstrated by adoption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act), Friedman
intimates, and those values then included approval of (and certainly not
widespread disapproval of) interracial marriage.
The racial environment in which the Court decided Loving, however,
was far more disapproving of interracial marriage than the consensus constitutionalist narrative would suggest. Whites had, it concededly appears,
become more accepting of such unions since the 1950s when, as Klarman
notes, a Gallup poll indicated that more than 9 out of 10 expressed
disapproval.4 02 Yet white racial enlightenment on this score remained
extremely limited, even in the late 1960s. A Gallup poll conducted in
1968-one year after Loving-revealed that 3 out of 4 whites continued to
403
The nationwide response (i.e., all
disapprove of interracial marriages.
races rather than only whites) was not much different, with 73 percent registering disapproval and just 20 percent indicating approval.404 Not only was
there an absence of consensus voicing approval of interracial marriage in
1968, national consensus-to the extent that one existed-affirmatively
disapproved of the practice. It is certainly true that only sixteen states had
laws on the books that Loving upended,405 but that is not because citizens in
marriage, much as the Justices struck down restrictions on interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia
(1967) after the civil rights movement had rendered anachronistic that last formal vestige of Jim
Crow.").
398. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 249.
399. Id. at 249-50.
400. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
ConstitutionalLaw in The Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2286 (2002) (claiming that
"it took half a generation, and a sea change in our culture, for the Court to get from Brown to
Loving").
401. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 249-50.
402. See KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 321.
403. See Joseph Carroll, Most Americans Approve ofInterracialMarriages, GALLUP (Aug. 16,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/28417/Most-Americans-Approve-tnterracial-Marriages.aspx
2007),
(noting that-among whites respondents to interracial marriage in 1968-75 percent disapproved,
and just 17 percent approved).

404. Id
405. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967).
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the remaining thirty-four states generally thought that race was irrelevant to
marital considerations. A clear majority of Americans thought that race was
exceedingly relevant to marital considerations, and had no compunction
about expressing this notion to pollsters. It is important to note that as late as
1994, Gallup found that only 48 percent of Americans expressed approval of
interracial marriage.406 The first year that Gallup registered a majority
approving of interracial marriage occurred in 1997.407
That the overwhelming majority of Americans disapproved of interracial
marriage when the Court issued Loving in 1967 reveals a couple of different
things. First, it undercuts the idea that the Court possesses virtually no power
to extend protection to minorities who are not held in high esteem by a
majority or a near majority of the populace. Approval of interracial marriage
at the time of Loving was a decidedly minority phenomenon. Second, the
decision helps to underscore the very real stakes that are raised by adhering
to the slogan that the courts should not get out too far in front of the
people.408
The American public's widespread disapproval of interracial marriage
during the 1960s also offers a particularly stark caution against the way that
consensus constitutionalism sometimes draws upon public opinion. It is important to emphasize that the public opinion polls that consensus
constitutionalists cite do not always expressly ask respondents for a view regarding whether a program is legal or constitutional, but instead ask merely
for a policy preference. 4 09 At least some evidence suggests that, in the minds
of many Americans, the sphere of policy, on the one hand, and the sphere of
legality, on the other, may not be coextensive. 410 In the context of interracial

406. See Carroll, supra note 403 (noting that 37 percent of respondents disapproved of
interracial marriage and 15 percent expressed no opinion).
407. Id In 1997, the approval percentage for interracial marriage increased to 64 percent. Id.
408. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial
Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1021, 108 1 (2004) ("Lawrence

and Romer undid most of the pluralism damage of Hardwick-but without making the mistake of
getting too far ahead of the country.").
409. For example, in analyzing the Court's decisions regarding affirmative action at the
University of Michigan, Friedman cites a poll conducted in 2003 by the Pew Research Center to
show a shift in public attitudes on the issue of affirmative action between 1995 and 2003.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 361. The poll cited by Friedman, however, did not question the
constitutionality of affirmative action, but instead asked, "In order to overcome past discrimination,
do you favor or oppose affirmative action programs. .. ?" News Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the
People & the Press, Conflicted Views of Affirmative Action I (May 14, 2003), available at
http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD= 184.
410. A recent divergence of views regarding policy preference, on the one hand, and legality,
on the other, arose during the controversy surrounding the plan to build a mosque and Islamic
cultural center in Manhattan, close to the site of the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001. Although a poll conducted in August 2010 revealed that only 30 percent of respondents
indicated that the building's proposed location was "appropriate," more than 60 percent of
respondents agreed that "the Muslim group has the right to build a mosque there." FOX News Poll
1 (Aug. 13, 2010), available at http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/081310_MosquePoll.pdf.
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marriage, for example, the percentage of people who expressed disapproval
of interracial marriages has exceeded the percentage of people who
suggested that interracial marriages should be illegal since at least the
In 1968, when Gallup found that 75 percent of whites
1960s.41
"disapprove[d]" of interracial marriage, the University of Chicago's National
Opinion Research Center found that 56 percent of whites thought "there
should be laws against" it.4 12 It is far from astonishing, though, that consensus constitutionalists do not generally highlight the difference between
polling questions inquiring about policy views and questions inquiring about
legal views.413 Much of their view of constitutional interpretation, after all,
nearly insists upon eliding the distinction between what people (including
judges) desire as a first-order preference and what they believe the law requires.
2. Same-Sex Marriage.-The Court's decision in Loving leads to the
constitutional question of same-sex marriage. To state only the most obvious
connection, both matters involve two people who wish to wed each other, but
are prohibited from doing so because of tradition and the attendant deep ob-

411. Gallup's poll asked respondents whether they "approve[d] or disapprove[d]" of interracial
marriage. Carroll, supra note 403. National Opinion Research Center's poll asked respondents
whether "there should be laws against" interracial marriage. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 286,

at 108 tbl.3.1B.
412. See Carroll, supra, note 403; SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 286, at 106-08 tbl.3.IB.

Intriguingly, another Gallup poll found on March 10, 1965 that a bare majority of the nation
approved anti-miscegenation laws, 48 percent to 46 percent. See Hazel Erskine, The Polls:
InterracialSocializing,37 PUB. OPINION Q. 283, 292 (1973). It bears mentioning, however, that the
polling question's phrasing may have overstated the opposition to anti-miscegenation laws. The
question stated: "Some states have laws making it a crime for a white person and a Negro to many.
Do you approve or disapprove of such laws?" Id. (emphasis added). One need not have been an
especially keen student of current affairs in 1965 to realize that "some states" effectively meant
states in the South. And many nonsouthern respondents-and not a few southern respondentswould have wanted to be understood as rejecting that region's racial recalcitrance. Indeed, given
that the poll was taken just days after Bloody Sunday occurred in Selma, Alabama, it is telling that
more respondents nevertheless approved than disapproved of such laws. Rather than evincing racial
egalitarianism, it seems plausible many respondents who disapproved of "some states"' laws were
evincing anti-antiegalitarianism.

Cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, Ill

YALE L.J. 1141 (2002).
In all events, as the above analysis of post-Brown northern racial attitudes suggested, it seems
incorrect to understand this 1965 poll to indicate a widespread desire for equality regarding love
across racial lines. In August 1967, shortly after the Court issued Loving, a Harris poll asked: "As
far as your own personal feelings go, would you be personally concerned or not if your own teenage
child dated a Negro?" Erskine, supra, at 289. Ninety percent of white respondents indicated that
they would be concerned. It seems safe to believe, then, that when Chief Justice Earl Warren in
Loving excoriated justifications for Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws as amounting to "White
Supremacy," 388 U.S. at 7, he was not articulating the consensus views of American society.
413. Rosen notes the difficulty of using polling about policy preferences as a proxy for legal
views. See ROSEN, supra note 12, at 9 ("Polls are hardly a reliable indicator, since polls seldom ask
people what they think about constitutional issues, as opposed to policy issues . . . ."). Having duly
noted the difficulty, however, his argument nevertheless often draws upon such polling.
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jections of many individuals who wish to continue that tradition. Mildred
Loving, the black woman who married a white man in the case bearing her
name, observed this very connection when she announced her support of gay
marriage in 2007.414 Where tradition once held that a person may marry only
a person of the same race, tradition today generally holds that a person must
not marry a person of the same sex.4 15
Apart from the substantive issue of whether such analogies are
doctrinally legitimate, Loving raises the question of when an oppressed group
should seek to have the judiciary confer recognition upon a contested right.
This very timing question was, of course, debated intensely in 2009 after a
legal team, led by David Boies and Theodore Olson, the erstwhile
antagonists from Bush v. Gore, filed a lawsuit in a federal district court in
California.4 16 Many advocates of gay equality contended that, while they
shared the lawsuit's goal, it was simply "premature" to request judicial
Evincing an unmistakable manifestation of consensus
relief.417
constitutionalism, Human Rights Campaign and Lambda Legal, along with
other organizations supportive of same-sex marriage, issued a press release
asserting, "The history is pretty clear: the U.S. Supreme Court typically does
not get too far ahead of either public opinion or the law in the majority of
states."418 After all, voters in California had only months earlier effectively
reversed a California Supreme Court decision that conferred the right to gay
marriage. 4 19 But the individuals who claimed that it was simply too early to
push for the federal recognition of same-sex marriage may prove unwisely
and unnecessarily beholden to the consensus-constitutionalist mindset.
Recent statements about gay marriage from two of today's most
distinguished legal thinkers acutely display the difficulty of gauging
contemporaneous views regarding a hotly contested question. In the context
of Court decisions vindicating gay rights, Sunstein suggests that such
decisions have not "come as bolts from the blue.'A20 Instead, Sunstein
414. Mildred Loving, Loving for All (June 12, 2007), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/page//files/pdfs/mildred loving-statement.pdf; see also Susan Dominus, The Color of Love, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2008, (Magazine), at 21 (chronicling Mildred Loving's process of embracing gay
marriage).
415. I use the word "generally" here because five states (Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Vermont) along with Washington, D.C., currently issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples. Ian Urbina, Nation's Capital Joins 5 States in Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage,

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, at A20.
416. Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight California Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y.

TIMES, May 28, 2009, at Al.
417. See id. at A15 (quoting one Lambda Legal official as saying, "We think it[']s risky and
premature.").
418. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union et al., Make Change, Not Lawsuits 3 (May 27,
2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/1gbt/make-change_20090527.pdf.
419. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008). The California Supreme Court
upheld Proposition 8 in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63-64 (Cal. 2009).
420. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 4.
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contends that these cases, such as Romer v. Evans 42 1 and Lawrence v.
Texas,422
emerged from a social context in which such discrimination seems
increasingly difficult to defend-in which We the People have been
coming, in fits and starts, to think that gays and lesbians should not be
put in jail for consensual relationship[s], and that discrimination
against them, at least by government, is hard to defend.423
He also suggests that same-sex marriage is a modem analogue to Naim
where "consequentialist considerations . . . justify a degree of judicial
hesitation."424 Regarding the next frontier for gay equality in the federal
judiciary, Sunstein sounds a note of caution: "Ifthe Court ever does conclude
that states cannot ban same-sex marriage, it will only be after much of the
public has already done so.",425 Last year, Judge Richard A. Posner similarly
wrote, "Until homosexual marriage becomes as uncontroversial in most
states as racial intermarriage had become by 1967, the Court will, in all
likelihood, stay its hand.A 2 6
The statements of Sunstein and Posner possess an intuitive appeal, as
few issues seem more hot-button and divisive in modem America than gay
marriage. These statements, however, may betray serious misapprehensions.
Polling data reveals that, Sunstein's intimation notwithstanding, "much of the
public" had already concluded that states should-as a matter of law-no
longer ban same-sex marriage by the time that he wrote that statement.
Although the responses to different polls regarding gay marriage demonstrate
volatility, a CNN poll taken in 2009 revealed that 45 percent of respondents
thought that the Constitution conferred a right to gay marriage while 54 percent of respondents thought no such right existed.427 These findings,
moreover, are hardly aberrant. Indeed, a Gallup poll taken in 2007 revealed
that 46 percent of respondents thought that the law should permit same-sex
couples to marry and 53 percent thought that the law should not permit them
to do so.428 Most recently, a CNN poll taken in August 2010 found that 52
421. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
422. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
423. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 4-5.

424. Id at 164.
425. Id. at 5. See Eskridge, supra note 408, at 1081 ("If most Americans believe that gay
people are ... not qualified for the elevated status of civil marriage, the judiciary not only cannot,
but ought not, impose same-sex marriage on the hesitant body politic.").
426. Richard A. Posner, The Race Against Race, THE NEw REPUBLIC (Jan. 29, 2010),
http://www.tnr.com/book/review/the-race-against-race.
427. CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll 3 (Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://i2.cdn.tumrner.
com/cnn/2010/images/08/l l/rell la.pdf.
428. Lydia Saad, Tolerance for Gay Rights at High-Water Mark, GALLUP (May 29, 2007),

http://www.gallup.com/poll/27694/Tolerance-Gay-Rights-HighWater-Mark.aspx (reporting data for
the Gallup Poll for May 10-13, 2007). Since 2007, this poll has found that support for gay marriage
has somewhat eroded. The poll taken in May 2009 revealed that 40 percent of respondents thought
that such marriages should be so recognized and 57 percent thought that the law should not
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percent of respondents indicated that gays and lesbians "should have a constitutional right to get married and have their marriage recognized by law as
valid."429
Transitioning from law and toward approval-an issue Judge Posner
gestured toward by addressing the "[]controversial" nature of same-sex
marriage-precious little data exists on this question. Polling questions
about gay marriage, for whatever reason, are almost invariably phrased in
terms of legal views rather than policy preferences. The available polling
reveals, though, that same-sex marriage (at least when considered on a
national basis) has long garnered more approval and less disapproval than
interracial marriage had when the Court decided Loving in 1967. A
Quinnipiac University poll measured low support, finding that only 36
percent of respondents supported gay marriage and 55 percent opposed gay
marriage. 43 0 But even these results reveal that gay marriage enjoys broader
support and less opposition than interracial marriage enjoyed even postLoving.43 These surveys do not, of course, tell the whole story regarding the
likelihood of public acceptance. 432 But neither can they be ignored in
wrestling with the question of whether the moment is ripe to have the Court
resolve the same-sex marriage question.
If the Lovings and their attorneys had been driven by polling data on
interracial marriage when they initially filed their lawsuit in 1963,433 it seems
highly implausible that they would have decided to contest Virginia's antimiscegenation provision. Indeed, approximately two weeks before they
filed, Newsweek ran an article that featured polling results demonstrating that
overwhelming disapproval of interracial relationships was a national

recognize these unions.

Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority of Americans Continue to Oppose Gay

Marriage, GALLUP (May 27, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/pollll18378/Majority-AmericansContinue-Oppose-Gay-Marriage.aspx. But, one year later, in May 2010, respondents indicating gay
marriages should be recognized had increased to 44 percent; 53 percent said that such unions should
not be recognized. See Jeff Jones & Lydia Saad, Gallup Poll Social Series: Values and Beliefs,
GALLUP (May 24, 2010), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/128297/Gay-Marriage-May-

2010.aspx.
429. CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll, supra note 427, at 3.
430. Quinnipiac Univ. Poll (July 17, 2008), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/xl295.xml?ReleaselD=
1194.
431. Recall that in 1968 just 20 percent of Americans approved such unions and 73 percent
disapproved. See Carroll,supra note 403.
432. Perhaps the most important consideration that is excluded from this data is the intensity of
support and opposition. A 2009 NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll measured the intensity of
respondent sentiments regarding the right to enter into same-sex marriage and found that among the
categories-"strongly oppose," "somewhat oppose," "somewhat favor," and "strongly favor"-the
largest group (40 percent) formed the "strongly oppose" camp. "Strongly favor" was the second
largest group, but well behind at 26 percent. NBC News/Wall Street Journal Survey 23 (Oct. 2009),
availableat http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/wsjnbc-10272009.pdf.
433. 388 U.S. at 3.
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phenomenon. 4 34 "The closest that whites came to unanimity on any racial
question was over the issue of interracial dating, which many view as the
prelude to intermarriage," Newsweek observed. "Ninety per cent of all
whites throughout the country said they would be concerned if their teen-ager
dated a Negro. The percentage is 97 in the South. Elsewhere the figure falls
no lower than 88 per cent.'A 35 In 1963, it seems clear, the Lovings did not
have consensus on their side. But perhaps fueled by a "romantic" belief in
both their love and-not incidentally-in the Court that would decide their
fate, the Lovings decided to file a lawsuit anyway. Just because a view of the
Court may be romantic, in other words, does not make it foolish.
Yet, even if one subscribes to the notion that the Court requires
approval from approximately 50 percent of the public or greater to issue a
particular outcome, it is extremely doubtful that an individual who wishes to
have a legal claim vindicated would be well-advised to wait until after polls
register the requisite level of support before simply filing suit. Lawsuits
often take a number of years to make their way to the Court, and it is
certainly possible that public opinion polling at the time of filing that reflects
merely nascent support will have surpassed the majority level of public
support by the time that the Court makes a decision.43 6 Consensus, at least of
the watered-down variety that consensus constitutionalists often cite, may
sometimes materialize right before our very eyes.
Despite the widespread idea that it is vital for a consensus to emerge on
the question of same-sex marriage before filing a federal lawsuit, ample
reason exists to believe that those supporting expanded marital rights
permitted a prudent length of time to elapse before raising the contested legal
question. The period of time that is required to elapse between a potential
legal victory that is thought initially by some to be unfathomable and the
time that actual victory is secured can be shockingly short.437 Brown and
Loving, it is worth remembering, were decided only thirteen years apart.
Loving, moreover, may actually stop the clock three years too late from the
point when the Court first applied the racially egalitarian principle to matters
of sexual intimacy. In McLaughlin v. Florida, decided in 1964, the Court
invalidated a statute that criminalized cross-racial cohabitation with members

434. How Whites Feel About Negroes: A Painful American Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21,

1963, at 44.
435. Id. at 49. The accompanying article featured a quotation from a San Diego, California
resident stating: "Shaking hands is OK, but kissing-no thanks." Id. Similarly, the article quoted a
Pennsylvania resident stating: "I don't like to touch [blacks]. It just makes me squeamish. I know I
shouldn't be that way, but it still bothers me." Id. at 50.
436. There is never any guarantee, of course, that public approval will continue to expand
rather than shrink. See supratext accompanying notes 150-51.
437. Intriguingly, Professor Sunstein has observed that "norm entrepreneurs" can, under the

right circumstances, help to facilitate dramatic societal transformations in surprisingly short order.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929-30 (1996)
(identifying the end of South African apartheid as such an instance).
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of the opposite sex, a ruling that doctrinally made Loving's result nearly
axiomatic.43 8 Adopting McLaughlin rather than Loving as the relevant
endpoint, then, reduces the period of time between Brown and the Court's
expressed willingness to extend racial egalitarianism to sexual intercourse-a
ruling that would have supposedly been unimaginably incendiary had it been
issued at the time of Naim-to a mere ten years.4 39
If contemporary suits seeking same-sex marriage are akin to
McLaughlin and Loving, what judicial opinion serves as the Brown of the gay
rights movement? In other words, what is the appropriate time from which
to start the clock running? The conventional view, at least in this instance,
seems to be the correct one, meaning Lawrence v. Texas serves as the equivalent of Brown.44 0 Lawrence, like Brown, was widely understood as placing
the fundamental issue of full formal equality squarely on the table-something that Romer did not achieve. 44 1 Thus, Lawrence elicited intense
opposition among some people who derided the decision as illegitimate not
so much because they thought that sodomy should be prosecuted, but because they feared that the decision would lead to same-sex marriage.44 2
Although Romer surely received a hostile reception in certain quarters,443 its
reception paled in comparison to Lawrence's.444

438. 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX,
MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 272 (2003) (contending that Loving "was practically a

foregone conclusion, especially since, in McLaughlin v. Florida (1964), the Court had already
invalidated a Florida statute that criminalized interracial fornication").
439. See Posner,supra note 426, at 4 (noting the at least somewhat mysterious phenomenon by
which Loving, rather than McLaughlin, is the celebrated breakthrough); see also Ariela R. Dubler,
From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106

COLUM. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2006) ("McLaughlin v. Floridagets short shrift in standard historical
accounts of the legal regulation of race, sexuality, and interracial intimacy. These accounts usually
crest not at McLaughlin but rather at Loving v. Virginia.").
440. See, e.g., E.J. Graff, The High Court Finally Gets It Right, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2003,
at DI 1 (contending that "Lawrence is our Brown v. Board ofEducation").

441. In Romer v. Evans, the Court invalidated Colorado's effort to prohibit state entities from
deeming gays a protected class. 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996). Viewing Romer as the Brown of gay
rights is intriguing not least because doing so would mean that it has already been fifteen years
since the nation has contemplated full gay equality, two years longer than the gap between Brown
and Loving. But Romer bears a closer resemblance to some of the cases that chipped away at the
edifice of Jim Crow that preceded Brown. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher
Ed, 339 U.S. 637, 640-42 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1950).
442. Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-by-State Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,

2003, at N8.
443. See 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I would not myself indulge in such
official praise for heterosexual monogamy, because I think it no business of the courts (as opposed
to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war.").
444. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6-3, Legalize Gay Sexual Conduct in Sweeping Reversal

of Court's '86 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at Al ("Groups representing the socially
conservative side of the Republican Party reacted to the decision with alarm and fury."); Kershaw,
supra note 442 (quoting Professor William Rubenstein as stating "'The right wing is really
galvanized by this [decision], throwing down the barricades."').
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Nearly eight years have now elapsed since the Court decided Lawrence.
On August 4, 2010, Judge Vaughn Walker issued a decision validating the
right to gay marriage in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the first federal case raising the issue." 5 Given the lengthy period of appeals and deliberation that
accompany most decisions that end up in the Court, and Perry's unusual procedural quirks, it seems plausible that the Court will not decide any same-sex
marriage case before approximately 2013. ' If the Court decided that case
or a similar case at that time, the period between Lawrence and a decision
from the Court would match the period between Brown and McLaughlin.
Two years from now may be too soon for anything resembling consensus to
emerge on a divisive question like same-sex marriage. History reveals,
however, that it will not be too soon for the Court to recognize that right
without unduly imperiling either its own legitimacy or the quest for gay
equality.
The point here is not to suggest that, on the tenth anniversary of a Court
decision that confers a measure of legitimacy upon a widely-reviled group,
magical dust sweeps the nation making it safe for further legal advancement.
It is merely to contend that the Court possesses considerably more leeway
than the consensus rubric often seems to permit-at least from a forwardlooking vantage point. In the event that the Supreme Court should use Perry
as a vehicle to validate a right to same-sex marriage, it seems plausible that
consensus constitutionalists would incorporate the decision into their
worldview by attributing it to "an emerging national consensus" regarding
marital equality. In reality, though, the decision would more accurately be
understood as arising from a deeply contested constitutional landscape. In
other words, the decision would constitute judicial business as usual.
Conclusion
In 1968, toward the end of the last book that he would write, Richard
Hofstadter offered an incisive (and, almost certainly, self-critical) appraisal
of recent developments in his field. Hofstadter wrote:
If there is a single way of characterizing what has happened in our
historical writing since the 1950's, it must be, I believe, the
rediscovery of complexity in American history: an engaging and
moving simplicity, accessible to the casual reader of history, has given
way to a new awareness of the multiplicity of forces. To those who

445. See 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
446. The federal cases decided by Judge Tauro in July 2010 involving challenges to the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) raise-at least potentially-a narrower set of issues than those
raised by lawsuits directly challenging state prohibitions on same-sex marriage. See generally Gill
v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA violated the
equal protection principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA exceeded
Congress's power under the Spending Clause and violated the Tenth Amendment).
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find things most interesting when they are simple, American history
must have come to seem less interesting in our time; but to those who
relish complexity, it has taken on a new fascination.447
More than four decades after Hofstadter wrote those words, historians continue to embrace the complex rather than the simple.
Legal academia's external examination of Supreme Court history, in
contrast, remains enthralled with simplicity. Law professors should disavow
the casual manner in which they invoke consensus and the notion of an
emerging national consensus to explain constitutional legal history.
Consensus constitutionalism
too often obscures the ideological
disagreements and even the ideological uncertainty that undergird lawsuits
resolved by the Court. Rather than altogether abandoning external inquiries
into Court decisions, however, law professors might instead reexamine
twentieth-century constitutional history with an alternate external prism, one
that places conflict, not consensus, at the analytical center. This Article has
employed contested constitutionalism to revise our understanding of Brown
and Loving, two of the most closely examined constitutional decisions
throughout the Court's entire existence. Going forward, more legal scholars
might contemplate applying contested constitutionalism to provide a richer
historical account of many significant events in American legal history.
Yet, important as enriching our historical understanding of Supreme
Court decisionmaking is, contested constitutionalism involves considerably
more than improving history books. Despite concerns about the supposedly
growing chasm between the work of judges and the work of scholars,448 the
manner in which prominent law professors understand and explain the
Court's history and its ability to protect minority rights has a way of seeping
into the broader intellectual culture. Ultimately, those understandings and
explanations exert influence upon how judges perform their jobs. Contested
constitutionalism, with its insistence that the Court has in fact often issued
decisions that challenge prevailing sentiments, seeks to preserve the Court's
countermajoritarian capabilities.

447. HOFSTADTER, supra note 65, at 442.
448. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 35 (1992).

